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Consumer credit and consumer bankruptcy filings have grown rapidly over the last two decades, 
and several researchers have attempted to understand the relationship between these two 
intertwined features of the modern American economy. Teasing out causation is almost 
impossible, as consumer advocates lay blame on the industry and the industry responds by citing 
the same data to show consumer misbehavior. Using a novel vantage point, this analysis 
examines what the credit industry's behavior toward recently bankrupt families reveals about its 
internal profit models and the likely causes of consumer bankruptcy. The empirical evidence on 
postbankruptcy credit solicitation belies the industry’s characterizations of bankrupt families as 
opportunistic or strategic actors. Original data from longitudinal interviews with consumer 
debtors show that lenders target recent bankrupts, sending these families repeated offers for 
unsecured and secured loans. The modern credit industry sees bankrupt families as lucrative 
targets for high-yield lending, a reality that has important implications for developing optimal 
consumer credit policy and bankruptcy law. 
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 The recent reform of America’s bankruptcy law favored the interests of creditors. In the 
two years since the reform, obtaining consumer bankruptcy relief has become more expensive, 
more time-consuming, and more difficult.1 These legal changes were motivated by a perceived 
need to reduce the incentives and ability of consumer debtors to “overborrow” and then seek 
relief from the bankruptcy system.2 This strategic behavior model was arguably more a matter of 
perception and politics than documented empirical reality.3 Nonetheless, this vision of financial 
distress dominated the public discourse as the justification for reducing the availability and scope 
of consumer bankruptcy relief.  
 The credit industry aggressively promoted an understanding of bankruptcy that focused 
on personal responsibility for financial outcomes. In its view, many bankruptcy debtors were 
prodigal spenders who engaged in irresponsible financial activity when they accumulated debts. 
Bankrupt families were assailed for lacking the moral conviction to repay their debts. 
Bankruptcy was proffered as an easy way out that attracted consumers who were intent on 
gaming the credit system.4 The credit industry convinced Congress that curtailing bankruptcy 
                                                 
1 See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 375, 377 
(cataloging changes to Bankruptcy Code that impose burdens on consumer debtors); NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER 
BANKR. ATTY’S, BANKRUPTCY REFORM’S IMPACT: WHERE ARE ALL THE “DEADBEATS?” (2006), available at  
http://www.nacba.com/files/main_page/022206NACBAbankruptcyreformstudy.pdf; Henry J. Sommer, Trying to 
Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005”, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005). 
2 See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavorialism, 
and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006) (“Congress recently enacted 
legislation motivated by the perception that rational consumers act strategically when they borrow money and file 
for bankruptcy.”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to 
Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 459 (2005) 
3 See Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology & Beyond, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming 2007) (describing how opponents of bankruptcy reforms used data to refute allegations of strategic 
debtors); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS 
AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE  71-80 (2003) (describing the “myth of immoral debtor” and evaluating evidence 
to support this conception of bankruptcy filers).  
4 See Dickerson, supra note 3, at nn. 168-169 (“Supporters [of BAPCPA and its predecessors] focused on the 
culture of bankruptcy and the importance of ‘personal responsibility,’ and suggested that debtors lacked integrity 
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relief was sound social policy.5 Such reforms were supposed to dampen prodigality and 
encourage consumers to make prudent financial decisions. This focus on debtor behavior led to 
bankruptcy reform that intended to alter the incentives and practices of consumers.  
 The credit industry’s lending decisions were not subjected to similar scrutiny to that 
imposed on debtors’ borrowing or bankruptcy decisions. Nor were lenders held to the same 
moral standard for evaluating the appropriateness of their financial practices as debtors were. 
Creditors’ strategic behaviors, and the consequences of their lending activity, were not an 
integral part of the debate over bankruptcy reform.6 The financial practices of creditors were 
never closely examined, perhaps in part due to difficulty in obtaining proprietary lending data. 
The fragmented regulatory framework for consumer lending also hindered efforts to identify 
problems in the consumer credit market. Further, theoretical scholarship has emphasized the 
law’s role in shaping debtors’ incentives, rather than evaluating how creditors react to 
bankruptcy laws. These factors combined to shroud the realities of consumer credit marketing 
and lending. While the amount of consumer credit had obviously mushroomed in the past 
decade, the blame for the increased bankruptcy rate that accompanied this credit expansion was 
put squarely on the shoulders of consumers rather than creditors. This focus on debtors has 
distracted scholars and lawmakers from examining how lenders contribute to financial distress 
and from considering how bankruptcy law influences creditor behavior.   
                                                                                                                                                             
because they no longer felt any personal obligation to pay debts they could afford to repay.”); Mann, Sweatbox, 
supra note 1, at 377 (“The catch phrase in the legislative history was the ‘bankruptcy of convenience.’”).  
5 As Mechele Dickerson has explained, bankruptcy reform raised ideological issues that may have persuaded 
individual members of Congress to favor the legislation. See Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1. However, the standard 
characterization of the legislation is a public choice story that strongly emphasizes the consumer credit industry’s 
capture of Congress through lobbying and financial contributions. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The 
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 613 (2002) (opining that then-
pending bankruptcy bill was “poster child” of result of imbalance of money and power between interest groups).  
6 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376 “(Proponents spent much less time discussing the economics of the 
consumer credit industry or the business models of those most affected by consumer bankruptcy.”); John A.E. 
Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 405, 407 (“Instead of, or at least in 
addition to, targeting debtors, Congress should fix its sights on creditors . . .”). 
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 This Article analyzes original empirical data from first-ever detailed longitudinal study of 
bankrupt families. This novel postbankruptcy vantage point offers a fresh perspective on the 
credit industry’s beliefs about the causes and consequences of consumer bankruptcy. The 
findings document how the credit industry responds to consumers’ bankruptcies, exposing the 
credit industry’s bankruptcy rhetoric to empirical challenge. If even a modest proportion of 
bankruptcy debtors are untrustworthy deadbeats who behave in immoral or strategic ways, the 
credit industry should be reluctant to lend to these families.  These families have self-identified 
themselves as “profligates” by filing bankruptcy, thereby giving lenders hard, public evidence 
that they borrowed and did not repay. Even after bankruptcy, these families will have ample 
opportunity to avoid repaying new postbankruptcy loans. Indeed, the credit industry’s portrayal 
of bankruptcy debtors suggests that these families are skilled at evading collectors, hiding assets, 
shielding income from garnishment, and relying on state laws such as exemptions to prevent 
legal action. Faced with this knowledge, lenders should eschew bankruptcy debtors. Creditors 
should purge these families from their solicitation lists, and when approached by these families, 
demand security for any loan.  
 In fact, the data show the opposite. This Article’s key finding is that creditors repeatedly 
solicit debtors to borrow after bankruptcy. Families receive dozens of offers for new credit in 
each month immediately after their bankruptcy discharge. Some offers specifically target these 
families based on their recent financial problems, using bankruptcy as an advertising lure. Other 
credit offers emanate from the very same lenders that the families could not repay before 
bankruptcy. While not every lender will accept a “profligate” bankrupt as a customer, debtors 
report being overwhelmed after bankruptcy with a variety of credit solicitations from many 
sources. Lenders offer families most types of secured and unsecured loans. The widespread 
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efforts of creditors to lure bankrupt families into new borrowing relationships stand in stark 
contrast to the credit industry’s portrayal of these families’ propensity for honoring their 
obligations.   
While credit card solicitations are ubiquitous, most families report receiving offers for car 
loans, second mortgages, live checks and other credit lines. Two paradoxes emerge. Debtors 
report more difficulty in obtaining secured loans than unsecured loans. This outcome is 
surprising, as collateral is thought to mitigate credit risk.7 Despite bemoaning the risks created by 
immoral and strategic borrowers, many lenders do not bother to secure loans to bankrupt 
families. Also, debtors who chose Chapter 13 (repayment) bankruptcy instead of Chapter 7 
(liquidation) bankruptcy have fewer opportunities to borrow. Rather than identifying them to 
creditors as a “responsible” borrower, repaying a portion of their past debts actually hinders a 
family’s access to future credit. Creditors’ actual behavior undermines the industry’s purported 
policy goal of channeling more families into Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. On the whole, the 
credit industry treats former Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors as valuable customers, seeking to 
profit by loading these families with new debt immediately after bankruptcy.  
The vast opportunities to borrow after bankruptcy belie the credit industry’s assertions 
about the immoral or strategic behavior of bankruptcy debtors. When the empirical data are 
juxtaposed against creditors’ rhetoric in support of restricting bankruptcy relief, the gulf between 
creditors’ actions and words is enormous. Despite their disparagement of the character of 
bankrupt families, lenders actively solicit them as future customers. This empirical evidence 
suggests that the credit industry takes one view of bankruptcy debtors to Congress, the media, 
and public, but it itself literally “banks” on a different view of bankruptcy debtors. While the 
                                                 
7 See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
168, 171 (2002) (citing research on reasons for existence of secured credit).  
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data are not conclusive on bankruptcy causation, creditors’ interest in lending to bankrupt 
families is consistent with acceptance of an adverse events model of bankruptcy. If the vast 
majority of families are unable to pay because of an external financial shock such as illness or 
injury, creditors need not refrain from soliciting bankruptcy debtors as customers out of serious 
concern that these families will borrow intending to evade future obligations using strategies 
other than bankruptcy. The strong overall pattern of credit offers to bankruptcy debtors suggests 
that creditors themselves reject a view of bankruptcy filers as either immoral individuals who 
chronically fail to honor their obligations or as strategic actors who are apt to abuse legal 
protections to avoid debts.  
Creditors’ targeted marketing to recently bankrupt families exposes a consequence of the 
deregulated credit market—distressed borrowers are highly lucrative. The findings on creditors’ 
postbankruptcy behavior show that substantial segments of modern credit markets rely on 
financial distress for their profitability. Bankruptcy law itself facilitates this business model, 
making debtors’ names a matter of public record and lengthening the required period between 
bankruptcy discharges to assure lenders that bankruptcy will not likely bar their future collection 
efforts. Understanding the realities of how creditors contribute to the financial distress dynamic 
has crucial policy implications. Bankruptcy law could be a powerful tool to shape creditors’ 
financial practices, not just debtors’ financial practices. Current law gives insufficient attention 
to the collective harms imposed by the credit industry’s distressed-based profit model.  Armed 
with knowledge of creditors’ strategic lending behavior, policy makers can consider and 
implement reforms that will reduce the credit industry’s incentives to engage in lending that 
thrives when families suffer from financial distress. 
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 Part I of this Article documents the debtor-focused rhetoric that drove the bankruptcy 
reform debate and shows how recent scholars have responded by emphasizing the need to 
understand creditors’ contribution to the bankruptcy dynamic. Part II presents original empirical 
data on creditors’ behavior toward families who have filed bankruptcy. The findings emphasize 
the need for policy attention to the economics of consumer lending and its effect on financial 
distress. Part III develops the implications of these findings for bankruptcy and consumer law. 
An exclusive emphasis on “strategic” debtors is myopic. Law powerfully shapes the behavior of 
creditors, and these incentives may be suboptimal or harmful to society. Effective consumer 
credit policy requires a rich understanding of how lenders stimulate and profit from financial 
distress.  
I. THE MODERN CONSUMER CREDIT ECONOMY  
A. The Debtor Debate 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) 
made sweeping changes to the consumer bankruptcy system.8 BAPCPA was the final result of a 
long struggle to narrow the availability of bankruptcy relief.9 The rhetoric of the reform debate 
focused on accusations that debtors were engaged in “strategic” behavior—borrowing without 
intention to repay and using bankruptcy as financial tool to avoid repaying those debts. The 
principal policy response was to incorporate a means test into the Bankruptcy Code that would 
screen families for the ability to repay as a condition for bankruptcy relief.10 The credit 
                                                 
8 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended throughout 11 U.S.C.).  
9 See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (chronicling history of efforts to restrict bankruptcy relief).  
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(2). Numerous critics have attacked the means test. Some have complained that it 
creates a large administrative and expense burden that is not justified by the few families who are subject to the test. 
See Charles Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 16 (2001) 
(concluding that then-pending “means testing would create a huge new bureaucratic burden for courts, trustees, 
debtors, and debtors' attorneys--for everybody in the bankruptcy game, that is, except creditors.”); Elizabeth Warren, 
A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 506 (1997) (describing potential of 
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industry’s characterization of debtors as strategic actors was challenged with empirical evidence 
on the problems facing families who seek bankruptcy relief.11 Researchers documented the low 
to moderate incomes of most families in bankruptcy,12 and pointed to decades of research 
confirming that job problems, illness/injury or family break-up were pandemic in the bankrupt 
population.13 However, efforts had an unintended effect. They reinforced debtors as the focus of 
bankruptcy reform, subtly helping to ensure that policy proposals avoided creditors’ activities. 
This section briefly describes the credit industry’s strategic-debtor model of bankruptcy and its 
influence on amending the Bankruptcy Code.  
Attempts to show that the rising bankruptcy rates was the result of debtors’ strategic 
behavior was persistent tool in the decade-long effort to enact bankruptcy reform. 
Commissioners who dissented from the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s 
recommendations for the consumer bankruptcy system expressed concern about debtors’ 
incentives under bankruptcy law. They claimed the existence of a “[g]rowing perception that 
                                                                                                                                                             
means testing to harm consumer bankruptcy system as social safety net). Others have offered better systems to 
accomplish the goal of ensuring that creditors are repaid if a family can repay. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela 
M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 666 
(2005); Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather than Means Testing: Using the Tax 
System to Collect from Can-Pay Consumer Debtors After Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (Feb. 2003).  
11 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Subcomm. 
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (statement by Elizabeth 
Warren) (2005). Some representatives cited the findings of these studies in the debates about bankruptcy reform. 
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H1979 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) (“[W]hile some who file 
bankruptcy have been financially irresponsible, the overwhelming majority of those who file do so as a result of 
divorce, major illness, or job loss. Half of those who go into bankruptcy do so because of illness, and most of them 
had health insurance but still could not pay their bills.”) 
12 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ETAL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 61-62 (2000) (finding that 
the median income for those who file bankruptcy is almost half the national median); Marianne B. Culhane & 
Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 
Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 37 (1999) (reporting that only 24% of those in bankruptcy had incomes 
above the national median). My own pre-BAPCPA scholarship focused on debtors’ circumstances as well. See 
Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 971, 973 
(documenting that rural bankruptcy debtors have more severe economic circumstances than urban bankruptcy 
debtors and using this finding to argue that bankruptcy reform could particularly harm rural families).  
13 See SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 12 at 186; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3, at 
81 tbl. 4.1; Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
116, 142 (2002).  
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bankruptcy has become a first resort rather than a last measure for people who cannot keep up 
with their bills.”14 The credit industry formed organizations to advocate for bankruptcy reform 
and hired powerful lobbyists to assert this perception of why consumers file bankruptcy.15 
Reform proponents focused on the incentives created by a Chapter 7 discharge, asserting that 
some bankruptcy filers received new credit shortly before bankruptcy or filed bankruptcy even 
though they were not in default.16 Congressional representatives echoed these fears about 
strategic or immoral debtors. Bankruptcy was “just another tool of financial management” for 
too many families looking to “skip out” of their debts.17 Prodigality and strategic rationality were 
wedded together in the strongest characterizations of debtors as immoral actors. Representative 
Gekas lamented that “bankruptcy has become a way for reckless spenders to escape their 
debts.”18 Advocates of bankruptcy reform deployed an alternate argument that the bankruptcy 
system effectively amounted to a $400 tax on each American family each year.19 This 
“economic” approach incorporated moral concerns too, however, since the persuasive power of 
this argument was ostensibly that such a tax was unfair to “moral” and “responsible” families 
who repaid their debts and did not file bankruptcy. Overall, the debate centered on 
                                                 
14 REPORT OF THE NAT’L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, ch. 5 (1997) (Recommendations for Reform of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, at 2).  
15 Dickerson, supra note 3, at nn. 78-84 and associated text (forthcoming 2007) (collecting accounts of 
bankruptcy reform that rely on public choice theory to show influence of credit industry in enactment of legislation); 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 498-99 (describing efforts of the Bankruptcy Issues Council, the Consumer Bankruptcy 
Reform Coalition, and the American Financial Services Association in lobbying for restricting bankruptcy relief.)  
16 NAT’L BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REVIEW, ch. 5, supra note 14, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for 
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law at 11.  
17144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21643 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is that some people use 
bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts that they could repay.”)   
18 National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Rep. Gekas). 
19 See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77 (2004) (chronicling history of 
bankruptcy tax figure and its role in lobbying efforts for bankruptcy reform).  
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characterizations of debtors as strategic actors who reacted in immoral ways to undesirable 
incentives that bankruptcy law created for borrowers.20  
When policymakers did focus on the lending industry, the principal complaint was the 
intensity of creditors’ lobbying efforts to enact bankruptcy reform. Representative Henry Hyde 
critiqued the substance of the proposed legislation, but added the following postscript: “Lastly, 
let me pay my respects to the creditor lobby. They are awesome.”21 Mechele Dickerson has 
suggested that this public choice focus on lobbying and campaign contributions shortchanged the 
policy debate.22 She identifies the ideological underpinnings of the bill as a struggle about the 
scope of “personal responsibility” that bankrupt families should bear for their financial distress.23 
However, this description bankruptcy’s ideology largely ignores the possibility of such a debate 
as a forum for discussing the appropriate responsibilities of creditors.  
Some legislators made periodic efforts to highlight perceptions of hypocrisy by creditors 
who complained about overindebted debtors while continuing to lend to these customers.24 Such 
efforts were diluted by the panoply of alternate arguments raised against the proposed 
legislation.25 Although the final bill included “Consumer Protection” in its title, the legislation 
made only modest reforms to creditor practices, which focused on additional disclosures in credit 
                                                 
20 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376. (“In particular, the debates often focused on . . . the concern that the 
skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates indicate that consumers are using the bankruptcy system for financial planning 
purposes.”) 
21 145 CONG. REC. 2723-2724 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement by Rep. Hyde on H2718).  
22 Dickerson, supra note 3, at 20.  
23 Id.; Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376 (“For the most part, proponents relied on moral arguments—how 
shameful it is that Americans walk away so easily from their debts.”)  
24 Jensen, supra note 9, at 520, n. 199.  “Members who opposed the legislation argued that the increase in 
bankruptcy filings was due to the credit card industry itself, which, they claimed ‘actively solicits unsuspecting 
consumers through the mail with terms of easy credit . . . addicting debtors to this financial crack.’” (quoting 
statement of Rep. Jackson Lee made in opposition to a 1999 bankruptcy reform bill).  
25 Opponents complained that various versions of the legislation were too complicated, would be too costly to 
implement, were unfair to women, were drafted without the input of bankruptcy experts, were technically defective 
and internally inconsistent, and would not halt the worst instances of abuse in the system. For a representative 
sampling of these critiques during the entire bankruptcy debate, see Jensen, supra note 9.  
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contracts.26 BAPCPA did require the Federal Reserve to conduct a study on “consumer credit 
industry practices of soliciting and extending credit—(A) indiscriminately; (B) without taking 
steps to ensure that consumers are capable of repaying the resulting debt; and (C) in a manner 
that encourages consumers to accumulate additional debt.”27 The purpose of the study was to 
examine the “effects of such practices on consumer debt and insolvency.”28 This provision 
“sense of Congress” may be a tangible reflection of frustrations about the paucity of quantitative 
data about creditor practices.   
The required report was issued in June 2006 and bore the promising title, “Report to 
Congress on the Practices of the Consumer Credit Industry in Soliciting and Extending Credit 
and their Effects on Consumer Debt and Insolvency.”29 Yet, it contained no new data and yielded 
few insights on actual credit practices.30  Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence, the 
report issues a “key finding” that “as a matter of industry practice, market discipline, and 
banking agency supervision and enforcement, credit card issuers do not solicit customers or 
extend credit to them indiscriminately or without assessing their ability to repay.”31 The report 
concluded that “[c]onsideration of an existing or potential customer’s ability to repay is a major 
                                                 
26 Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1306; 19 Stat. 23, 204-213.  
27 Id. at § 1229; 19 Stat. 23, 200. 
28 Id.  
29 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRACTICES OF THE CONSUMER 
CREDIT INDUSTRY IN SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEBT AND 
INSOLVENCY (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/bankruptcy/bankruptcybills 
tudy200606.pdf.   
30 See Warren Reports on the Middle Class, TPM Café, Problems? What Problems? Fed Paints Happy Face on 
Credit Card Debt, (Aug. 8, 2006) (excerpting long statement from Ronald Mann on weaknesses with Federal 
Reserve study pursuant to section 1229 of BAPCPA), available at http://warrenreports.tpmcafe.com/blog/warrenre 
ports/2006/aug/08/problems_what_problems_fed_is_clueless;  Pottow, supra note 6, at 418, n. 47 (describing 
Federal Reserve report required by section 1229 of BAPCPA as “anticlimax.”) To be fair, Congress did not allocate 
additional funds to the Federal Reserve to conduct this study and gave it only one year to complete the report. See 
generally Katherine Porter, The Potential and Peril of BAPCPA for Empirical Research, 71 MISSOURI L. REV. 963, 
972-976 (2006) (identifying reasons for skepticism about mandatory reports incorporated into BAPCPA).  
31 FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 3.   
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aspect” of credit solicitation and credit extension.32 This statement fails to evaluate how lenders 
weigh repayment ability. In fact, lenders may consider ability to pay as a negative factor, rather 
than a positive factor in their profit models.33 The mere fact that risk-scoring models include 
measurements of propensity or willingness to pay does not mean that lenders limit lending to 
risky customers. Indeed, lenders may profit from financial distress meaning that credit extensions 
to troubled borrowers are not “indiscriminate” but deliberate. 
The realities of such lending models (the subject of the next section of this Article) did 
not sidetrack the rhetoric of bankruptcy reform from its obsession with strategic debtor behavior. 
Lenders’ “strategy” in marketing and extending credit was an occasional sideshow, at best, in the 
circus of Congressional debate.  The role of bankruptcy law in incentivizing undesirable credit 
activity was ignored entirely. To the contrary, the bill was heralded as a critical measure to 
ensure that current lending practices were sustained in the future. When he signed BAPCPA into 
law, President Bush explained that law “will ensure that more Americans can get access to 
affordable credit.”34 The President expressed concern that debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system 
has “made credit less affordable and less accessible, especially for low-income workers who 
already face financial obstacles.” The opposite possibility—that families who are struggling 
financially may have too much credit opportunity—did not receive serious policy attention. 
Instead, BAPCPA was praised for its ability to help those who did seek bankruptcy relief “avoid 
future credit problems.”35 This Article’s original data on credit marketing to former bankruptcy, 
                                                 
32 ID. at 26.  
33 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 384 (noting for debt-based credit card issuers the “most profitable customers 
are sometimes the least likely to ever repay their debts in full.”)  
34 Press Release, White House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection 
Act (Apr. 20, 2005) available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html; see also 
Jensen, supra note 9, at 566-67.  
35 Id.  
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debtors provides crucial evidence for evaluating the effects of bankruptcy reform on optimal 
credit use. 
B. Models of Consumer Lending  
After BAPCPA’s enactment, several prominent scholars have tried to identify the stakes 
of the credit industry in bankruptcy law and in financial distress more generally. This work has 
documented recent changes in the economics of the consumer credit markets. These efforts 
highlight the importance of data on the actual practices of lenders with respect to financially 
distressed borrowers. Bankruptcy debtors are a useful sample for measuring how lenders react to 
information that families face serious financial problems.36 While literature on postbankruptcy 
credit is sparse, prior studies illustrate need for effective policymaking to be cognizant of 
creditors’ role in the financial distress dynamic. 
 Scholars have disagreed on whether consumer debt correlates with bankruptcy, the most 
common measure of financial distress in such research.37 Debates about causation have been 
even more heated. Most research uses aggregate national data, due to weaknesses in household 
data,38 and looks broadly at how the expansion of consumer credit tracks bankruptcy filings.39 
Some studies have focused particularly on credit cards because card use and card debt greatly 
expanded during the same period as consumer bankruptcy filings.40 This line of research 
                                                 
36 WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME TRAP, supra note 3, at 81 (showing that large fraction of families with 
children who file bankruptcy reported either job problems, illness or injury, or a family break-up as a reason for their 
bankruptcy).  
37 See, e.g., Robert Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 348, 367-368 (2007); Teresa A. 
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 213, 248-250 & fig. 10 & 11 
(2006) (charting changes in household debt using Federal Reserve data).  
38 RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 61-62 (2006). 
39 See Robert M. Lawless, Relationship of U.S. Bankruptcy Filings and Consumer Debt 5 (Oct. 4, 2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934798.; FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 18 tbl. 6. 
40 See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
249 (2007); MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38; Todd Zywicki, Credit Card Economics, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 
(2000); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-offs, and 
the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS, (May 1998).  
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generally concludes that climbing consumer debt burdens have some substantial relationship 
with higher bankruptcy filings.41 These findings are limited by the fact that aggregate data reflect 
“only a typical household and may not be indicative of financial distress.”42  
Prior Consumer Bankruptcy Project research has yielded useful household-level data on 
the economic characteristics of families in bankruptcy.43 These findings offer a “snapshot” view 
of the debt obligations of families at the time that they seek bankruptcy relief. They do not 
illuminate how families accrue debt over time or what proportion of debt corresponds to 
borrowing shortly before bankruptcy. The credit industry, which surely tracks these trends, did 
not offer proprietary data on these points during the bankruptcy reform debate,44 choosing to 
evidence the strategic debtor model with anecdotes, not empirics. 
Despite public lamentations about failure to pay, the credit industry may in fact seek out 
such families. Two recent articles explain this phenomenon and illuminate how current law 
permits creditors to a profit by strategically targeting families in financial distress. Drawing on 
behavioral economic theories, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger have explored how the 
“myth of the rational borrower” dominates bankruptcy and consumer credit policymaking.45 
They describe how this construct drives fears that the “Bankruptcy Code encourages inefficient 
and opportunistic ex ante decisionmaking.”46 Block-Lieb and Janger contrast this theoretical 
portrayal of borrowers with the reality of creditors’ continued expansion of the market for credit, 
noting that the success of the business strategy of subprime lending requires that “nonstrategic 
                                                 
41 MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 69.; see also FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND 
EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 15 (“The rate at which consumers file for bankruptcy has broadly trended up 
with the real value of revolving consumer credit per household.”)  
42 FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 13.   
43 SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 12 at 63-71; WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME 
TRAP, supra note 3, at 64 & tbl. 4.1.  
44 NAT’L BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION, ch 5, supra note 14, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for Reform 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Law at 10-11. 
45 See generally Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2.  
46 Id. at 1486.  
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borrowers must outnumber the strategic borrowers and the interest and fees paid by (at least 
some) nonstrategic borrowers must outweigh the costs of strategic borrowers’ defaults.”47 In 
their view, consumer credit policy evinces a misplaced focus on borrower rationality.48 They 
argue that technology facilitates lender opportunism by permitting the credit industry to 
accurately target highly profitable borrowers who are likely to incur fees, interest, and other 
charges that feed superior profit margins.49 Lenders exploit financial distress in this strategic 
manner, leaving bankruptcy (and other social institutions) to address the harm caused by 
overborrowing.  
This model of consumer lending suggests that the credit industry’s motivation for 
bankruptcy reform was not realigning borrower incentives. Ronald Mann has developed an 
alternate explanation for how creditors may benefit from bankruptcy reform.50 Focusing on 
credit card issuers,51 Mann sketches a “dynamic of profitability” how financially distressed 
borrowers generate hyper-profits.52 He contrasts this new lending model with conventional loans 
to illustrate how financial distress—at least to a point—fuels, rather than depresses revenue.53 
Indeed, credit card companies enjoyed record profits as the bankruptcy rate escalated.54 Mann 
identifies ways that BAPCPA may enhance profits from families in financial distress by delaying 
                                                 
47 Id. at 1488. 
48 Id. at 1565. (“To extent that rationality and opportunism exist in consumer credit transactions, they both 
appear to exist on the lender, not the borrower, side of the equation.”) 
49 Id. at 1500. 
50 See Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 378-79. He prophesizes that “it is unlikely that the principal features of 
[BAPCPA] will have any substantial effect on the borrowing decisions of consumers.” Id. at 379.  
51 Mann focuses on debt-based credit card issuers, contrasting their lending products with conventional loans. Id. 
at 384. The share of revenue from default-driven provisions like penalty fees, late charges, and loan transaction fees 
for refinancing may be growing in other lending markets, such as mortgage loans and car loans, as specialized 
secured loan products for subprime borrowers are developed. The success of relying on fee revenue in these broader 
markets is unclear at this time.  
52 Id. at 385. 
53 Id. at 386. 
54 Adam Goldstein, Why “It Pays” to “Leave Home Without It”: Examining the Legal Culpability of Credit 
Card Issuers Under Tort Principles of Products Liability”, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 827, 856.  
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or deterring bankruptcy.55 Growing recognition of such lending models has spawned law reform 
proposals that aim to limit such lending or to force lenders to internalize the harms of financial 
distress.56  
This Article applies this prior research to a particular example of lenders’ interest in 
financially distressed customers. Families who file bankruptcy face challenges in achieving 
financial well-being, even after a bankruptcy discharge.57 Just one year after bankruptcy, a 
substantial minority of families report that their financial position has worsened or failed to 
improve.58 Many struggle to meet ordinary expenses.59 Examining the availability of 
postbankruptcy credit complements efforts to understand lenders’ role in financial distress. As an 
example of a population in financial trouble, postbankruptcy families illustrate the breadth and 
depth of credit markets for distressed customers generally. 
Existing longitudinal research on bankruptcy debtors is sparse. Most evidence is 
anecdotal and did not focus squarely on creditors’ behavior toward bankrupt families. This 
literature does usefully reveal the range of perceptions about postbankruptcy credit and illustrates 
the need for recent data that reflect the modern consumer lending market. 
Accounts of the availability of postbankruptcy credit differ greatly. Many people 
considering bankruptcy, and indeed many who file bankruptcy, apparently believe that 
bankruptcy will devastate their ability to borrow.60 The general public may have a similar 
                                                 
55 Id. at 392-97. 
56See, e.g., Pottow, supra note 6.  
57 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 91-92 
(2006) (describing financial issues facing families whose self-reported financial condition worsened after 
bankruptcy).  
58 Id. at 87, Fig. 3 and 88 (“More than one in three families stated that their financial situations had either stayed 
the same or worsened since the time of their bankruptcies.”) 
59 Id. at 84, Fig. 1 (reporting that 25% of Chapter 7 debtors in study reported difficulty in paying bills one year 
after bankruptcy.) 
60 The conventional wisdom that credit is hard to get after bankruptcy is typically spread by non-specialists. See, 
e.g., Michael Moody, Obtaining Credit After Bankruptcy: Mission Impossible (Oct. 16, 2006), 
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perception, which could effect how they view families who chose bankruptcy.61 These 
perceptions are curious because concern about widespread marketing to postbankruptcy families 
dates back over thirty years. An empirical survey of bankruptcy practitioners, judges, and 
academics in 1973 reported that participants saw the “problem of ‘aggressive solicitation of 
recently discharged bankrupts’ as very important.”62 These respondents were experts in 
bankruptcy, however, and they possessed insider knowledge of the bankruptcy system that the 
general public lacks. In recent years, newspapers have featured the rampant solicitation of 
families after bankruptcy.63 In an April 2005 story, the Washington Post profiled a woman who 
tried to avoid credit cards after bankruptcy but accepted one of many “preapproved” offers that 
she received because she found it hard to rent a car without a credit card. The story noted that 
firms specialize in marketing to bankrupt consumers and quoted their advertising materials 
trumpeting “unique and lucrative market.”64 The New York Times used the experience of one 
bankruptcy filer to shape its story, sharing her reports that every day she got “at least two or 
three new credit card offers—Citibank, MasterCard, you name it—they want to give me a credit 
card.”65 Quotes from banking industry representatives reflected some variation in credit 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://ezinearticles.com/?Obtaining-Credit-After-Bankruptcy:-Mission-Impossible&id=330141 (advising potential 
bankruptcy filers that they likely will not be able to get credit for at least a year or two after bankruptcy); Total 
Bankruptcy website, What the Credit Industry Doesn’t Want You to Know About Bankruptcy, 
http://www.totalbankruptcy.com/credit_industry_secrets.htm (debunking the myth that you cannot get credit after 
bankruptcy).  
61 Citibank, Personal Bankruptcy: The Negatives Far Outweigh the Positives, 
http://www.citibank.com/us/cards/cm/cntrol07.htm. 
62 Selwyn Enzer, Raul de Brigard, & Frederick D. Lazar, Some Considerations Concerning Bankruptcy Reform 
at 90 (March 1973) in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part III 
(July 1973).  
63 See, e.g., Robert J. Hawkins, Truth is Scary Than Fiction in ‘Maxed Out,’ PARAMUS POST, June 4, 2007, 
available at http://www.paramuspost.com/article.php/20070531201324776 (reporting on credit solicitations to 
bankruptcy debtors as highlight of film).  
64 Caroline Mayer, Bankrupt and Swamped with Credit Offers, WASH. POST., April 15, 2005, at A1. 
65 Timothy Egan, Newly Bankrupt Raking in Piles of Credit Offers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005.   
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marketing to recent debtors,66 but neither news story turned up any industry or government data 
to support the extent and nature of postbankruptcy credit availability.67  
More systematic research about postbankruptcy credit is quite dated. Given rapid changes 
in the lending environment, these data may not be reliable for policymaking. However, these 
studies illustrate how prior researchers have approached the topic of postbankruptcy credit. 
Fifteen years ago, Jean Braucher conducted qualitative research about the attitudes and practices 
of consumer bankruptcy attorneys.68 Although her study had a much broader focus,69 Braucher 
assessed the perceptions of debtors’ attorneys about postbankruptcy access to credit. Braucher 
found that lawyers are frequently asked about the impact of bankruptcy on future credit,70 wither 
her interviews causing her to conclude that “[m]ost debtors who consult bankruptcy lawyers are 
concerned about future access to credit,” She noted that while “nearly all” lawyers give advice to 
clients on this matter, that most do so without the benefit of accurate information.71 Most lawyers 
believed that Chapter 7 debtors had fast access to credit after bankruptcy and had experiences 
with clients being offered new credit immediately after filing bankruptcy (even before 
discharge.)72 Many attorneys expressed concern about the easy access to postbankruptcy credit.73 
This concern caused some attorneys to understate the availability of credit to potential Chapter 7 
                                                 
66 Id. (describing different approaches reported by Bank of America and Citibank) 
67 The Washington Post article reported preliminary data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample that is 
the basis for this Article’s analysis. Mayer, supra note 64, at A9. 
68See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 
516 (1993). 
69 Id. at 503. (“The ‘simple’ thesis of this article is that debtors’ lawyers pursue different mixes of four goals in 
consumer bankruptcy practice. They seek to serve their clients’ and their own financial interests, and they also 
attempt to fulfill some version of appropriate social role playing on the part of their clients and themselves.”). 
70 Id. at 537. 
71 Id. (“Most lawyers have not systematically researched these questions. It is not clear that they can obtain valid 
information from creditors or credit reporting agencies. All the lawyers have rough impressions about credit 
availability after chapter 7 and chapter 13 based on feedback from former clients, and nearly all give advice on this 
basis.”). 
72 Id. at 538.  
73 Id. (“Many lawyers said that it is common for debtors to obtain credit within a year or two of a chapter 7 filing. 
“It's too easy to get new credit,” said one lawyer. Another said, “the credit industry is recycling people.” Car loans 
and credit cards can often be obtained quickly after filing a chapter 7 case, the lawyers in all four cities said.”). 
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debtors.74 Braucher also identifies attorneys’ desire to have clients file Chapter 13 as a factor that 
dampens lawyers’ disclosure about credit availability after Chapter 7 bankruptcy.75 Attorneys 
apparently use their impressions about the type of credit, not just the availability of credit, to 
bolster their preference for Chapter 13 cases.76 Several lawyers believed that after a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, the available credit was “often at the highest rates and from the sleaziest 
purveyors.”77 Apparently, these attorneys believed credit would be cheaper or offered on more 
favorable terms after a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Braucher does not identify whether the attorneys 
had any evidence for these beliefs. These attorney impressions have a critical impact on the 
bankruptcy system because they shape debtors’ decisions about whether to file bankruptcy and 
what type of relief to seek.78 However, the research does not have sufficient data on 
postbankruptcy credit to use it as a lens for understanding creditors’ assumptions about and 
behavior toward bankruptcy debtors.  
Two empirical studies more precisely document the landscape of postbankruptcy credit. 
Each researcher used proprietary data drawn from bankruptcy filers’ credit reports. Michael 
Staten of the Credit Research Center examined the credit reports of 2,000 people who filed 
bankruptcy between 1978 and 1988.79 In the twenty to thirty years since that study’s families 
                                                 
74 Braucher, One Code, supra note 68, at 538 (“Another reason some lawyers do not discuss better credit 
availability in general after chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 13 is that they do not want to play up the idea of getting 
new credit. “You can get credit fast after chapter 7,” said one lawyer, who added quickly, “but I don't tell them 
that!” This lawyer has his clients cut up their credit cards in his office. He and other lawyers said that they try to get 
clients to focus on living within their means in the future and on saving rather than borrowing.”). 
75 Id. at 538-9. 
76 Id. The motivation to have clients chose Chapter 13 is driven largely by the ability to recover fees in 
installments through a debtor’s plan. Attorneys may also prefer Chapter 13 because most districts approve higher 
attorneys’ fees for Chapter 13 cases than Chapter 7 cases. Finally, some attorneys believe that Chapter 13’s 
repayment scheme has moral or educational benefits for their clients.  
77 Id. at 540.  
78 Id. (“Most lawyers in the study acknowledge that better credit availability after chapter 13 is a myth, but it is 
one that many clients believe and that can be used to manipulate them into choosing chapter 13.”). 
79 Michael E. Staten, The Impact of Post-Bankruptcy Credit on the Number of Personal Bankruptcies *12 (Credit 
Research Center, Purdue University, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Working Paper 58, January 1993). 
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filed bankruptcy, the variety and quantity of subprime credit has exploded,80 and Americans have 
loaded up on debt.81 These changes may undercut the applicability of the study to today’s credit 
markets. Nonetheless, it offers a useful methodology for examining the availability of 
postbankruptcy credit. Staten did not measure credit solicitations but instead focused on actual 
uptake of credit by families during the postbankruptcy period.82 Creditors who had lent 
prebankruptcy to these families accounted for a significant fraction of the credit that debtors 
accepted. One year after bankruptcy, 25.5 percent of new credit lines accepted by debtors were 
issued by prior creditors.83 Staten hypothesizes that an indeterminate amount of this new credit 
could result from pre-screened offers that were processed before the debtors filed bankruptcy, 
but offers no evidence of this effect. His conjecture may reflect surprise at the substantial 
fraction of creditors who chose to quickly lend again to bankrupt families. 
The second study of postbankruptcy credit analyzed the effect of the law prohibiting a 
bankruptcy that was filed more than ten years prior from appearing on a credit report.84 David 
Musto found that consumers’ FICO credit scores jumped significantly after a bankruptcy was 
expunged from their reports,85 and that this boost in apparent creditworthiness corresponded with 
                                                 
80 See Block-Lieb and Janger, supra note 2 at 1514 (“Credit scoring and risk-based pricing have permitted 
financial institutions and other consumer lenders to open up entirely new markets for their products, including the 
market for subprime lending.”); Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, State of the Nation’s 
Housing 2005 Report, Executive Summary, 19 & tbl. 20 at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/ 
markets/son2005/son2005.pdf.  
81 MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 53. Lawless, supra note 37, at 364 figs. 1.A & 1.B. showing 
increasing rate of non-mortgage short-term and long-term consumer credit.  
82 These findings are very important for testing how families respond to a bankruptcy discharge and are useful 
for testing the fresh start theory against the realities of postbankruptcy life. His principal findings are reported in 
several useful figures. See Staten at Exhibit 8 and 11.  
83 Id. at 15. Note, however, that only 16.2 percent of all debtors had accepted any new credit at the one-year 
postbankruptcy mark. Id. at 13.  
84 David K. Musto, What Happens When Information Leaves a Market? Evidence from Postbankruptcy 
Consumers, 77 J. OF BUS. 725, 726 (2004). The relevant federal law is the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(a)(1). 
85 Id. at 735.  
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debtors’ acquisition of new bank credit cards.86  Musto’s research nicely illustrates how law can 
and does shape creditors’ responses to families who file bankruptcy. Because Musto is studying 
postbankruptcy credit at such a distant moment—ten years after the bankruptcy filing—his 
research does not reveal the immediate reactions of the lending industry to bankruptcy. The 
ability to make inferences about postbankruptcy credit and financial distress is greatest when the 
time between bankruptcy and the measure of new credit offers is short.  
The prior research is insufficient to permit a nuanced analysis of postbankruptcy credit 
availability. This gap in the existing literature contributed to the dominance of the strategic-
debtor model and helped shield lenders from scrutiny.  
II. CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES AFTER BANKRUPTCY 
 
This Article analyzes original data from the only large longitudinal study ever conducted 
of consumer bankruptcy debtors. These empirical data expose the reaction of the credit industry 
to consumer bankruptcies—to repeatedly solicit bankrupt families to become new credit 
customers. Debtors’ reports of the vast market of postbankruptcy credit offer insights on lenders’ 
assumptions about the causes of bankruptcy and the need for bankruptcy reform. The findings 
show how the credit industry seeks to profit from financial distress. 
A. Methodology 
This section describes the study’s methodology and presents general findings about the 
respondents. The original data in this Article were collected during Phase III of the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project (CBP), which began in 2001 and ended in 2004.87 CBP III was a large, 
                                                 
86 Id. at 737 (estimating one extra card is obtained per four consumers in the tenth year postbankruptcy).  
87 I served as Project Director of CBP Phase III—2001 during its first six months of data collection. My 
responsibilities included pretesting the data instruments, overseeing the distribution and collection of the written 
questionnaires, and helping to design the court record coding protocols.  
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interdisciplinary study of consumer bankruptcy that involved a dozen researchers.88  The sample 
consists of consumer bankruptcy cases filed in the first months of 2001 in five judicial districts 
across the nation.89 The study had a “core” sample designed to be representative of all 
bankruptcy filers and several specialized samples to study particular issues.  This Article uses 
data only from the core sample. The total core sample contains 1,250 consumer bankruptcy 
cases, consisting of 780 Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 470 Chapter 13 bankruptcies.90 The ratio of 
sampled Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases reflected the distribution in each judicial district in the 
sample. 
CBP III used four instruments to gather data. First, a questionnaire was distributed to 
debtors at their meeting of creditors, a required part of the bankruptcy process.91 The 
questionnaire requested demographic information such as age, occupation, and marital status, 
and inquired about the family’s reasons for seeking bankruptcy relief.92 For each debtor who 
completed a questionnaire, researchers coded data from the debtor’s corresponding public court 
records, second data instrument. These bankruptcy petitions and schedules provided detailed 
information about the debtors’ assets, liabilities, income, and expenses at the time of their 
bankruptcies.    
                                                 
88 Additional descriptions of the methodology used in CPB Phase III—2001 have appeared in numerous articles 
presenting data from the study. See WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3 at 181-88; Porter & Thorne, supra note 57 at 
125-128; David U. Himmelstein et al., Market Watch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH 
AFF. Feb. 2005, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v1.pdf. A new iteration of CBP 
began in January 2007 to study post-BAPCPA debtors. I am an investigator in CBP Phase IV—2007 but no data in 
this Article come from that study.  
89 The CBP Phase III sample was collected in these five judicial districts: Eastern District of Pennsylvania; 
Northern District of Illinois; Middle District of Tennessee; Northern District of Texas; and Central District of 
California.  
90 See infra at note 96 for a discussion of the separate analysis of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases employed in 
this Article.  
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2005).  
92 A copy of the questionnaire is publicly available. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1003, 1028-32 (2002).  
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The questionnaire invited debtors to participate in a series of follow-up telephone 
interviews in return for compensation of $50 per interview. Approximately one year after 
bankruptcy, a small team of trained researchers conducted telephone interviews with 601 
families in the core sample.93 Approximately three years after the debtors filed bankruptcy (the 
spring of 2004), researchers attempted to contact each respondent that completed the first 
telephone interview to conduct a second telephone interview. These second-round interviews 
were conducted with 474 families in the core sample. Thus, all four data instruments 
(questionnaire, court records, one-year interview, and three-year interview) are available for 38 
percent of the original sample of 1,250 consumer bankruptcy cases.  
Both the one-year and three-year telephone interviews were approximately one hour long 
and were conducted using computer-assisted interviewing technology. A general set of questions 
was posed to every participant. Based on corresponding questionnaire or court record data, some 
participants were asked subsets of questions on topics such as homeownership and medical debt 
that pertained to their situations. The research team coded all responses into a specially designed 
database for each round of interviews. Most questions were closed-ended, although several 
points in the interview invited unstructured or supplementary responses. Because this was the 
first-ever detailed longitudinal study of consumer bankruptcy debtors, the families’ 
postbankruptcy experiences were the principal focus of each interview.  
For most of this Article, I limit the CBP III core sample to include only debtors who filed 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Part II, E, infra, I analyze data from respondents who filed Chapter 13 
cases to compare how postbankruptcy credit opportunities differ between Chapter 7 debtors and 
Chapter 13 debtors. At that point, I explain legal differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
justify considering the two types of bankruptcy separately. Analysis of the demographic and 
                                                 
93 See infra at notes 99-104 and accompanying text for analysis of issue of respondent bias.  
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economic characteristics of Chapter 13 respondents shows that these filers have higher incomes 
and more assets, and are more likely to be married, employed, or homeowners when they file 
bankruptcy than Chapter 7 filers.94 These significant differences are a further reason for 
considering separately the experiences of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors.  
The Chapter 7 sample used for this Article was narrowed from the 780 Chapter 7 cases in 
the core sample to include only those cases in which a first round telephone interview was 
completed. The longitudinal perspective of my analysis requires data on the postbankruptcy 
experiences of debtors, and the telephone interview was the instrument used to gather such data. 
Thus, the relevant sample (unless otherwise specified)95 contains 359 Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases 
and captures 45.9 percent of the 780 Chapter 7 cases in the core sample.96  
I compared the Chapter 7 telephone interview sample to the demographic finding of 
previous bankruptcy studies.97 These studies measured common demographic and economic 
characteristics of debtors, such as age, marital status, occupational prestige score, 
homeownership, median annual income, and median unsecured debt. The respondents in this 
sample appear consistent with the profiles of Chapter 7 debtors in prior studies.98 Primary 
petitioners in the Chapter 7 telephone interview sample averaged 43 years old. Approximately 
                                                 
94 These differences were significant at the .05 level. The differences between the sex of the primary petitioner 
and the families’ total liabilities at the time of filing were not significant. Details on the demographics of Chapter 7 
debtors are presented in the main text. 
95 See Section E, infra, in which the sample consists of Chapter 13 debtors in the core sample who completed the 
first telephone interview.  
96 Some debtors could not be contacted at the contact information that they provided because the debtors had 
apparently moved or provided incorrect information. In anticipation of this problem, we asked debtors to provide us 
with two alternative contacts, which increased the response rate. Nevertheless, some debtors gave only their own 
information, and sometimes the alternative contacts could not be located. We were unable to complete interviews 
with these debtors. This non-participation may have skewed the data to overrepresent the economic stability of the 
postbankruptcy population. That is, those who could not be located for interview may be those facing the most 
severe financially distress, considering that they either moved and/or changed telephone numbers in the immediate 
aftermath of their bankruptcy.  
97 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3; Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of 
the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
98 Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 121 (2003) (concluding that 2001 
bankruptcy debtors are middle class and similar to debtors who field in 1991). 
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one-third were married and living with a spouse, while another 7 percent were married but living 
separately. The median occupational prestige score was 36; occupations such as office clerk, 
bricklayer, teacher’s assistant, and steel worker are represented by this score. Approximately 31 
percent of the respondents reported that they owned their home at the time of filing. Families 
earned a wide range of incomes. Eight households, or just over two percent of the sample, said 
they received no income whatsoever.  At the other end of the spectrum, one debtor reported 
annual earnings of just over $101,000. Overall, median annual income for households in the 
sample was $21,870, about half of the national average.99 Median unsecured debt was $27,528. 
Like other researchers, I conclude that most bankruptcy debtors are demographically similar to 
middle-class Americans but earn much lower incomes at the time of their bankruptcies.100 
Debtors who completed the telephone interviews were self-selected, introducing the 
possibility of respondent bias.101 To test for this, Dr. Deborah Thorne,102 the Project Director of 
the Consumer Bankruptcy Project when the interviews were conducted, compared interview 
participants and nonparticipants on several important demographic and economic variables. 
Demographically, the two groups were comparable on the variables of age, employment status, 
and homeownership. Interview participants were, however, significantly more likely to be single 
and white than those who did not complete interviews. Analysis of the economic variables did 
not reveal any statistically significant differences between the two groups. Debtors’ court records 
revealed similar incomes, assets, and liabilities. Based on this analysis, the narrowed sample 
                                                 
99 Id. at 125 (citing U.S. Census Bureau data for median household income in 2001 at $42,228 and comparing 
that figure with the median bankrupt debtor’s income of $24,108 in 2001).  
100 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12; Warren, Financial Collapse, supra note 98, at 155. 
101 EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 187-90 (2004).  
102 Assistant Professor of Sociology, Ohio University; Project Director of CBP Phase III—2001.  
 26
appears to be generally representative of the 780 Chapter 7 cases that comprised the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project’s core sample.103 
To increase the longitudinal perspective on postbankruptcy experiences, I also present 
data from the second round of telephone interviews completed in 2004. Of the 359 households in 
the sample used in this Article (Chapter 7 cases debtors who completed the first round telephone 
interview), 302 households completed a second interview approximately three years after each 
family’s bankruptcy. This modest atrophy in the sample reflects the increased difficulty in 
locating debtors as years elapsed after their bankruptcies and their completion of the written 
questionnaire. I report the number of respondents with the relevant data and indicate whether the 
data come from the first or second interviews. A comparative analysis of demographic and 
economic differences between the first round interview respondents and second round interview 
respondents showed no significant differences between the groups.104 
B. Soliciting Credit Customers 
The availability of postbankruptcy credit was a principal focus of the longitudinal 
interviews.  The detailed data reveal how the credit industry responds to bankruptcy and support 
assertions that the current economy for consumer credit relies on high-risk borrowing to 
maximize profits. 
Credit solicitation of recent bankruptcy debtors is rampant. Nearly all debtors stated that 
they had received offers for credit in the first months following their bankruptcy.105 Figure 1 
                                                 
103 Porter & Thorne, supra note 57, at 153 (reporting detailed respondent and nonrespondent data for subsample 
of 359 Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases from Consumer Bankruptcy Project Phase III 2001). 
104 I compared Chapter 7 respondents who completed the first round of interviews with the respondents who 
completed the second round of interviews along several variables: total assets at bankruptcy, total liabilities at 
bankruptcy, total unsecured debt at bankruptcy, income at bankruptcy, sex of respondents, homeownership, 
employment status, marital status and age. Tests of each group showed no significant differences for any of these 
factors.   
105 Again, these data reflect respondents from the Chapter 7 core sample who completed the first round of 
telephone interviews. Data on Chapter 13 families are presented in Section E, infra.  
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illustrates that just one year after bankruptcy, 96.1 percent of debtors were recipients of credit 
solicitations. Only 3.9 percent of families said they had not received credit offers. To the extent 
that the conventional wisdom says that debtors will not able to borrow immediately after a 
bankruptcy filing,106 the adage is neither wise nor reflective of today’s credit market.  
FIGURE 1 
Percent of Debtors Offered Credit and Who Accepted Credit 












Most debtors did not accept new credit, reporting that they were avoiding the credit 
industry entirely after bankruptcy. Debtors’ use of credit bears directly on the rehabilitative goal 
of consumer bankruptcy and further research could consider how debtors use credit during the 
crucial “fresh start” period after bankruptcy.107 
                                                 
106 See Section II.B., infra. 
107 Additional research will present data on debtors’ take-up of credit during the first three years after their 
bankruptcy. See Katherine Porter, Borrowing After Bankruptcy (forthcoming 2008). A modest fraction of families in 
addition to the 25 percent shown in Figure 1 may have access to credit after bankruptcy despite avoiding new 
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Debtors not only had the chance to borrow, they were inundated with solicitations urging 
them to borrow.108 One year postbankruptcy, these families reported that creditors sent them an 
average of more than fourteen credit offers per month. In practical terms, this means that more 
often than not, each new day after bankruptcy presented these former bankrupts with a chance to 
borrow. Table 1 gives summary statistics on the frequency of credit offers. While the reported 
numbers ranged significantly, the typical (median) family said it got ten credit offers each month 
on average. On an annual basis, this corresponds to more than 100 invitations to borrow.  
TABLE 1 
Frequency of Credit Offers Per Month in Year After Bankruptcy 
Average 14.56 
Median 10 
St. Dev. 29.35 
Number of respondents 339 
 
Most debtors did not seem to expect these solicitations. Debtors’ expectations about 
postbankruptcy credit were not a subject of the written survey that debtors completed shortly 
after their bankruptcy filing.109 However, comments in the longitudinal interviews suggest that 
some families were shocked at the response of lenders to their bankruptcy. A married man in his 
early 30s from Texas expressed this reaction: “I was surprised at how fast they wanted to get you 
back into the credit game, [at] all of the offers of credit. It was incredible. They sent us lots and 
lots of offers for credit right after we filed. And I was told that it would improve my credit 
                                                                                                                                                             
postbankruptcy credit. These families may have a prebankruptcy credit line that was reaffirmed in their bankruptcy 
and remains available for their use after bankruptcy.  
108 Analysis of respondents’ answers to the question asking them to report the number of credit offers that they 
get in a month revealed two suspicious responses of 300 offers per month (corresponding to 10 per day in a 30 day 
month). These two outliers were removed before these data were analyzed, and the findings on credit offers do not 
include these two individuals.  
109 Researchers interested in understanding how debtors chose between the two types of bankruptcy relief could 
fruitfully explore the role of credit expectation in the chapter choice decision. 
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history.”110 Debtors gave vivid and colorful descriptions of the numerous credit offers that they 
received after bankruptcy.111 A middle-aged real estate developer likened himself to “fresh meat” 
out on the market, noting that it seemed like everyone was willing to help him get credit back.112 
Families generally felt inundated with what they described as an “unreal” number of credit 
solicitations.113 
Indeed, families who have filed bankruptcy appear to be particularly desirable future 
borrowers. Bankruptcy debtors seem to receive more credit solicitations than the general 
American population. Industry researchers report that the average American gets six credit offers 
each month.114 The average bankrupt receives sixteen, nearly three times the number directed to 
the non-bankrupt family. A carpenter in his mid-30s warned that “[o]nce you filed for 
bankruptcy, lenders come out of the woodwork. . . . They just really try to get you back in debt 
again. I still get lots of offers [three years after bankruptcy] and just toss them.”115 Many debtors 
noted a marked uptick in credit marketing after bankruptcy. An insurance claims worker 
described her perception that bankruptcy improved her credit access. “All these offers that I get 
for financing—Before I filed I bet I could not get a loan. The ironic thing is I’m sure, say within 
                                                 
110 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, TX-07-067.  
111 A Tennessean claimed that “[p]eople have been running over me to get me to buy a car.” Consumer 
Bankruptcy project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, TN-07-062. Another debtor stated that he 
got frequent offers to refinance his mortgage and was mailed “live” checks. He told his interviewer, “If I don’t get at 
least one or two in a week, it is not a good week.” Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-
Year Postbankruptcy, PA-07-015.  
112 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview Three-Year Postbankruptcy, TN-07-133.  
113 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, IL-07-038. 
114 See Frontline, Secret History of the Credit Card (2004) available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/battle.html (citing research conducted by Synovate a 
private research firm). The overall response rate on credit card solicitations is very low and has dropped 
significantly in recent years. See FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30 at 
20, Tbl. 11 (showing that in 2004, the industry mailed 5.23 billion credit card solicitations that returned a 0.4 percent 
response rate.); David Enrich, Card Firms Curb Mailings—a Bit, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006 at D3 (reporting that 
data from marketing firm Synovate show that more than six billion credit card offers sent in 2005 generated 
response rate of only 3 per 1,000 offers). 
115 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview Three-Year Postbankruptcy, TN-07-041.  
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the six months before I filed, they would have laughed at me if I wanted to get a loan. Now they 
are saying ‘let us give you money.’”116  
The frequency and persistence of credit solicitations leaves many American families 
feeling overwhelmed.117 Federal Reserve researchers found that 85 percent of consumers in a 
study believed that credit card solicitations caused other consumers take on too much debt.118 In 
response to complaints about the deluge of credit industry mail, Congress passed legislation that 
allows families to opt-out of receiving prescreened credit offers.119 This regulatory intervention 
enables families to intervene in the credit market by eliminating themselves as a potential 
customer for new credit.  Opting out also can be a tool for financial discipline, reducing 
marketing pressure to borrowing and helping consumers to take affirmative control of their 
financial decisions.120 Yet, few families take advantage of the opt-out law, with the result that 
credit solicitations are a reality of modern American life.121  
Many debtors reported feeling frustrated, and even angered or scared, by the intensity of 
credit solicitations after bankruptcy. Indeed, these families’ frustration with credit offers may be 
even sharper than the typical American. These families’ downward spiral into bankruptcy was 
                                                 
116 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, PA-07-132. 
117 See Robert Berner, Cap One’s Credit Trap, Business Week (Nov. 6, 2006) (quoting consumers with six 
Capital One credit cards thinking that company was “nuts” for being “willing to give me another card” when he 
“owe[d] these people that damn much money.”); Bob Sullivan, Deluged with Credit Card Mail? Help is Coming, 
MSN Money Online (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8827007/ (documenting number of solicitations 
some families receive each month and describing law allowing consumers to opt-out of prescreened solicitations that 
responds to complaints about offers).  
118 FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 13.  
119 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e) (604 of Fair Credit Reporting Act); see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON UNSOLICITED WRITTEN OFFERS OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE at 
11-12 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/ 
UnsolicitedCreditOffers2004.pdf.  
120 See Angela K. Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income 
Consumers, 32 Tex. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2007),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=968330 (developing recommendations to improve opt-out law to provide users with more control over type of 
solicitations received).  
121 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON 
UNSOLICITED WRITTEN OFFERS OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE 17 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/UnsolicitedCreditOffers2004.pdf (stating that only 6% of 
people with credit records choose to opt-out).  
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punctuated with efforts to borrow their way back to financial stability and increasing reliance on 
credit to make ends meet. The number of dollars of debt discharged in bankruptcy was a tangible 
and public signal of the depth of their financial collapse. Because credit was crucial (albeit 
unsuccessful) strategy that they used in efforts to avoid bankruptcy, they may associate credit 
with financial failure. Their financial collapse may heighten their consternation about credit 
marketing and explain why such offers made many consumers feel vulnerable. When asked if 
she had received credit offers, a Californian proclaimed, “Constantly! I’ve been pre-approved 
more times than you can count. I just throw them in the trash. I actually got a $2000 credit card; 
it suddenly arrived in the mail, a real, live credit card. I scissored it up into 17 pieces. You’d 
think I was Donald Trump, the way they would send me credit cards. When I got that credit card, 
I sat down and wrote them a blistering letter, but I doubt anyone ever read it.”122 This woman’s 
disdain for credit solicitations seems to stem from her belief that she cannot afford $2000 in 
credit card charges. Her perception that lenders’ credit offers threatened her financial recovery 
after bankruptcy was echoed by many families. 
Generally debtors disapproved of the aggressive marketing to bankruptcy filers. A 
Californian said that getting credit cards after bankruptcy was “[n]ot as difficult as it should have 
been. It just seemed almost too easy. They just sent a piece of paper and said that I’ve been 
preapproved for $3000. It’s yours, just return the application.”123 This woman’s comments hint at 
some anxiety about the consequences of the widespread availability of postbankruptcy credit. A 
man in his mid-50s with some college education used the final open-ended question of the 
interview to share his frustrations. “The bottom-line profit mentality we have in the United States 
is one of the main issues here. I can’t believe how many credit applications are coming in even 
                                                 
122 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, CA-07-187.  
123 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview Three-Year Postbankruptcy, CA-07-149.  
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now.”124 This man’s shock at being a target of credit marketing is mingled with disdain. He 
seems to think that lenders’ willingness to profit from a postbankruptcy debtor should be a cause 
for policy concern. 
These respondents’ concerns reveal an important consequence of the “democratization of 
credit” that is rarely explored. Rather than seeing expansive credit as a benefit, families may 
desire restraints on credit marketing as an aid for improving their financial practices.125 Optimal 
policy must balance these desires against the goal of credit rehabilitation that is encompassed by 
bankruptcy’s fresh start theory.126  
C. The Bankruptcy Beacon 
The prior data show that lenders repeatedly solicit families who file bankruptcy. This 
section explores the identity of these creditors and their knowledge about their potential 
customer’s bankruptcy. The findings show that the industry’s appetite for “deadbeat debtors” 
results from neither miscalculation nor marketing mishap. Bankruptcy debtors are specifically 
targeted to become new consumers of credit products. The public record of these families’ 
bankruptcy cases serves as a beacon that guides lenders to these lucrative customers. 
One bank spokesperson has asserted that any credit card offers that it sends to people 
who have filed bankruptcy are inadvertent.127 The data cast doubt on this denial. Major lenders 
deploy sophisticated analytical tools to identify future customers and their anticipated 
profitability. This strategy has been fundamental to the price and term differentiation that 
                                                 
124 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, TX-07-057.  
125 See Littwin, supra note 120, at ___ (finding that low-income women would like credit card companies should 
be required to give consumers the option to set their own credit card limits or require consumer approval before 
increasing credit limits.)  
126 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 57, at 74 (describing how bankruptcy’s rehabilitative purpose includes 
enabling future borrowing); KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
99 (1999). 
127 Egan, supra note 65 (quoting Bank of America spokesman saying that it does not give credit cards to people 
who file bankruptcy but that a delay between the bankruptcy petition and credit reporting could cause a bank to still 
send an offer to someone who filed bankruptcy).  
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dominates the current lending environment.128 During the same period in which the bankruptcy 
rate escalated,129 technology improved the credit reporting and scoring systems. Simultaneously, 
marketing departments launched powerful incentives such as create “teaser” interest rates and 
affinity programs to attract customers.130 Given this formidable marketing prowess,131 accidental 
offers are probably rare. Most postbankruptcy credit offers could probably be prevented by the 
industry’s technology, and the sheer numbers of offers that continue for years after bankruptcy 
strongly suggest that very few offers were processed before the credit report showed the 
bankruptcy.  
The data suggest that lenders specifically target recent bankruptcy debtors. The evidence 
to support this assertion comes from debtors’ reports about the credit offers. Figure 2 illustrates 
two findings that strongly support the existence of a credit market for known bankruptcy debtors.   
The phenomenon of postbankruptcy credit cannot be dismissed as merely incidental efforts to 
solicit the general American population. 
 
                                                 
128 See FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 19 (noting existence of 
“varied product offerings” that allow creditors “to tailor incentives and products to specific segments of the market 
and to price them in a way that reflects the underlying risk of each segment.”)  
129ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/Bk2002_1990Calendar.pdf (number of filings per calendar year between 
1990 and 2002).   
130 See Frontline, supra note 114.  
131 FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 19 (“Lender ratings of 
potential borrowers have become increasingly sophisticated and automated over the past decade. Lenders have 
extensive information on borrowers available from credit reporting agencies and from proprietary databases. This 
information is combined with new quantitative modeling techniques—which help lenders rank prospective 
borrowers on the basis of historical information about borrowers with similar quantifiable characteristics—to guide 
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A vast majority of debtors had received credit solicitations that specifically mentioned 
their bankruptcy. Nearly 88 percent of debtors reported that lenders had referenced the debtor’s 
bankruptcy in their credit marketing. The prevalence of these offers reflects that at least some 
creditors intentionally seek out recent bankruptcy debtors as future customers. When asked if she 
had received any offers that mentioned her bankruptcy, a woman in her mid-30s affirmed 
“almost all of them.” She described their content, “We want to help, bankruptcy specialist, blah, 
blah, blah. It’s awful.”132 Another woman read an interviewer a loan offer that she had received 
for a car. The solicitation explained, “Your name was obtained due to your recent bankruptcy 
filing—don’t be alarmed. . . . We know that bad things happen to good people . . . We know that 
in the 12 months prior to bankruptcy people may experience considerable anxiety and stress. 
                                                 
132 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, PA-07-062. 
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With our help you could be driving a new car the same day your bankruptcy is discharged.”133 
As an accountant observed, “They seem to be looking for people who filed.”134 
Bankruptcy law facilitates these marketing efforts. Filing bankruptcy is a public act.135 
Individual creditors and the credit reporting bureaus search the records to obtain the names and 
contact information of bankruptcy debtors. Some companies specialize in trolling the court 
records and selling lenders lists of bankruptcy filers.136 Lenders’ access to this information for 
marketing purposes is probably an unintended consequence of the public nature of bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, the effect deserves policy attention.137 Amidst lamentations that the stigma of 
bankruptcy is declining,138 lenders are capitalizing on bankruptcy records to market to debtors. 
Notwithstanding the public rhetoric, creditors’ private message to these families is that far from 
being pariahs, they are welcome customers. 
Research on Chapter 7 debtors’ postbankruptcy experiences reveals the profit potential of 
former debtors. In the first year after filing, many families face financial difficulty and must cope 
with declining or stagnant incomes.139 People in financial distress are more likely to have 
revolving accounts, to have exceeded their credit limit, and to use cash advances (which carry a 
higher interest rate), creating what some researchers have termed “attractive cash flows.”140 If 
families’ face difficulty in making ends meet after bankruptcy, their profitability potential for 
                                                 
133 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, PA-07-108. 
134 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview Three-Year Postbankruptcy, CA-07-016. 
135 11 U.S.C. § 107(a). 
136 Two examples include Information Technologies Inc. (http://www.inft.net/) which provides a “Financial 
Hardship” database as an “excellent source for marketing leads” and Discreet Research (www.discreetresearch.com) 
which provides names and social security numbers for bankruptcy filers.   
137 See infra, Section III, A.  
138 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the 
Subcomm.on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (statement by 
Todd J. Zywicki) (2005) (stating that increased bankruptcy filings were caused by a loss of “personal shame” and 
“social stigma” previously associated with filing for bankruptcy). 
139 Porter & Thorne, supra note 57, at 94-95. 
140 A. Charlene Sullivan & Debra Drecnik Worden, Bankruptcy in a Bank Credit Card Portfolio, 13 J. OF RETAIL 
BANKING 3, 36-37 (1991-92).  
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lenders is greater. Fee and interest income are a major component of credit card lenders’ 
profits.141 Other subprime lending products may also rely heavily on such revenue. These 
families exemplify the ideal customers for lenders’ “sweatboxes.”142 These families may be slow 
to pay; they may make only small payments; they may incur huge fees; and their balances may 
negatively amortize. But they cannot seek bankruptcy relief. It is precisely this constellation of 
features that makes postbankruptcy families particularly profitable for lenders.143 These families 
will generate more profit than card holders who frequently pay off their balance in full but the 
bankruptcy risk is mitigated. In effect, lenders escape anxiety about how long the borrower can 
sustain his unstable position before bankruptcy. Free from price regulation,144 and staving off 
efforts to curb the substantive terms of their contracts,145 the consumer credit industry can market 
to families who are vulnerable to financial distress at a price and on terms that maximizes their 
profit.  
This profit potential explains perhaps the most remarkable fact about postbankruptcy 
credit offers. As shown in Figure 2, a substantial fraction of credit offers are made by the exact 
same entities that were creditors in these debtors’ bankruptcy cases. Over one in five debtors 
reported receiving a credit solicitation from a lender that they could identify as a scheduled 
                                                 
141 MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 23 tbl. 2.2. (Interest charges compose 65% of U.S. card issuer’s 
revenue.) 
142 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 391. Jay Westbrook apparently first coined the term “sweatbox” to describe 
the financial situation that maximizes credit card issuers’ profits. See Pottow, supra note 6 at 416.   
143 Id. at 385 (“The successful card lender profits from the borrowers who become financially distressed.”)  
144 Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978) (holding that 
National Bank Act preempted state laws that regulated interest rates). This decision “effectively released consumer 
credit providers from usury limits, and thereby encouraged the creation of a national, rather than purely local, 
market for consumer credit. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1488.  
145 Stop Unfair Practices in Credit Card Act, S.1396, 110th Cong. (2007); Universal Default Reform Act, 
H.2146, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.1461, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
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creditor in their bankruptcy.146 Given the incredible consolidation in the banking industry in the 
last decade,147 this figure may substantially underreport the frequency with which prebankruptcy 
creditors seek to become postbankruptcy creditors. Debtors may not be able to accurately 
identify the bank extending credit in a particular offer. For example, a borrower may say that he 
has a “United Airlines credit card”, without remembering that Chase Manhattan is the actual 
lender. When Chase Manhattan later sends him an offer to have a “Chase PerfectCard” card,148 
the consumer may not recognize that this offer emanates from the same bank that issued the 
United Airlines card.149 Even taking the finding as is, however, the data show that some lenders 
are undeterred by a bankruptcy discharge. 
Some debtors are shocked to discover that the very creditor who told them that filing 
bankruptcy would ruin their credit is now soliciting them as a customer.150 “I am continually 
getting offers for credit cards. Even the cards that I listed on my bankruptcy still offer me more 
cards but the interest rates are higher” explained a California woman.151 These families’ disbelief 
                                                 
146 The qualitative interviews contain additional evidence of repeat lending activity. “The same company that I 
had at bankruptcy sent me an application without asking.” Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview 
Three-Year Postbankruptcy, IL-07-053.  
147 Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the “Long, Strange 
Trip” About to End? FDIC Banking Review, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006jan/ 
article2/index.html.  
148 This is actually the name of a real general purpose credit card issued by Chase Manhattan. See Chase 
PerfectCard Credit Card Offer at  
http://www.chase.com/ccp/index.jsp?pg_name=ccpmapp/card_acquisitions/unsolicited/page/PFSCreditCardDetails
&sourcecode=64DY.  
149 Of course, it is possible that some people think of VISA as their lender, instead of recognizing that VISA is 
the provider of the card processing. This could lead to an overestimation of the number of same lenders, if debtors 
thought that a postbankruptcy offer from VISA was one from the “same creditor listed” in their bankruptcy. Several 
facts substantially reduce this risk. The bankruptcy schedules frequently list only bank’s name because it is the 
actual lender, omitting whether the card is processed by VISA. Also VISA would not have been involved in trying 
to collect the debt before bankruptcy, and the lender’s name or an affinity tie would probably be displayed more 
prominently on a credit offer than name or logo of the card processor.  
150 See Frontline, supra note 114. A married man who filed bankruptcy told the Frontline reporter of his 
experience. “We gone one yesterday from a credit card company that told me I’d never have credit with them again. 
One of the last times I talked with them, told them what our situation was, they said, ‘Well, we’re canceling your 
card. And you are, in essence, blackballed with us for life. You’ll never have a credit card from us ever again.’ 
Yesterday, [we] received a solicitation from them, zero percent for life, with up to a $50,000 line of credit.”  
151 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview Three-Year Postbankruptcy, CA-07-011. 
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at receiving credit solicitations is probably tempered by some terms of the new credit offers. In 
some cases, an offer for postbankruptcy credit disguises an attempt to collect discharged debt. 
Ten percent of families whose prebankruptcy creditors solicited them after bankruptcy reported 
that some of those offers had asked them to make payments on prebankruptcy debts.152 These 
future offers of credit were presumably conditioned on the debtor making a “voluntary” payment 
on debt discharged in bankruptcy. While these situations were relatively infrequent and were 
documented in only two percent of all Chapter 7 cases in the sample, they are nonetheless 
disturbing.153 A request to pay debt that was discharged in bankruptcy is prohibited.154 In some 
instances, postbankruptcy credit was a vehicle for enticing families to repay discharged debts. 
While a substantial minority of Chapter 7 debtors does, in fact, chose to repay a portion of their 
discharged debts,155 the numerous credit offers that debtors received each month would seem to 
make such repayments truly “voluntary” and not motivated by a need to obtain future credit.156 
Nonetheless, any debtors who accept these offers reinforce creditors’ incentives to violate the 
discharge injunction. Such fortunate creditors will get a double benefit. They will accrue the 
                                                 
152 This question was posed only to the 79 debtors who said that they received credit offers from the same 
creditors that were listed on their bankruptcy schedules. Eight of the 79 debtors said these lenders asked them to 
repay their old debts in the new credit offers.  
153 The data in the text reflect the affirmative responses to the query on repaying old debts of 8 debtors among 
the group of 79 who had received credit offers from their prebankruptcy creditors. However, at another point in the 
interview, all debtors were asked if a prebankruptcy creditor had contacted them after bankruptcy. Nearly four in ten 
(39%) of debtors in the sample reported such contact. Apparently, creditors frequently violate the discharge 
injunction. However, the wording of this question did not make clear whether “old debt” referred only to debts that 
were discharged or included prebankruptcy debts that were reaffirmed or debts that were non-dischargeable. Thus, 
the data do not permit a conclusive determination of what amount of this postbankruptcy contact by creditors 
violated the discharge injunction.  
154 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).  
155  Three years after bankruptcy, 20.8 percent of households reported they or someone else had made a payment 
on a debt that they had at the time of their bankruptcy. This included reaffirmed debts.  
156 Among the 62 families who made payments on at least one prebankruptcy debt, only three families cited 
“creditor required payment before agreeing to new credit” as one of the reasons for their voluntary repayment. This 
finding highlights the fact that debtors may repay discharged debts for reasons other than their own financial benefit. 
Understanding why one in five debtors makes a payment after bankruptcy would provide useful insights into 
debtors’ attitudes about their prebankruptcy creditors. 
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superior profits from postbankruptcy borrowing, but also reduce their loss from the debt 
discharged in bankruptcy. 
This complicated dynamic reveals the extent to which the credit industry is a repeat-
player market. A substantial fraction of creditors will try to engage the very same debtors in new 
borrowing. Less than one year after receiving notice that these families were no longer obligated 
to pay their debt to them, the very same creditors actively seek to lend again to these families. 
Because a vast majority of Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases in which unsecured creditors 
receive no distribution of payment,157 these lenders are apparently quick to forget that their 
desired customers are the same “strategic” and “immoral” borrowers who purportedly game the 
credit system. This dichotomy between words and actions is stark. Profit opportunities appear to 
motivate lenders to abandon any effort to stigmatize bankruptcy filers by denying them credit. 
Instead, bankruptcy law facilitates postbankruptcy credit solicitation.  
D. Paradox of Secured Credit 
Rather than eliminate credit, bankruptcy may, in fact, increase credit opportunity. 
Debtors are specifically targeted by lenders. These findings offer a twist on the adage that 
bankruptcy ruins one’s credit. This section discusses on the types and terms of credit that is 
marketed to families after bankruptcy. These data expose differences between lenders that 
suggest which segments of the credit industry rely significantly on financial distress to generate 
profits.  
                                                 
157 See Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant & Suzanne Hazard, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Chapter 7Asset Cases, 21 
AM. BANKR. INSTITUTE J. 22 (Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003) (reporting that 96 percent of all Chapter 7 cases (combined 
business and consumer total) were closed without any assets distributed); see also Susan D. Kovac, Judgment-Proof 
Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675, 678 (1991) (concluding that a significant segment of the 
bankruptcy population is judgment-proof debtors who have no non-exempt assets and earn wages below 
garnishment limitations).  
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After bankruptcy, families receive offers for most types of common credit. Figure 3 
illustrates the percentage of debtors who received different types of postbankruptcy offers. Most 
debtors had access to both secured and unsecured credit.  
FIGURE 3 
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General purpose credit card offers were ubiquitous. Nearly 93 percent of postbankruptcy 
debtors reported receiving a credit card solicitation. Filing bankruptcy is plainly an ineffective 
technique for eliminating the phalanx of credit card offers that arrive in one’s mail. Whether you 
pay your balance in full every month or declare yourself broke, the banking industry appears to 
have a credit card product that is suitable (and profitable) for your financial profile. This finding 
reinforces the segmentation of the card industry, and their efforts to reach customers who are 
vulnerable to financial problems.158  
                                                 
158 MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 190.  
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Retail charge cards were less common. Only about one in five debtors were solicited to 
open these accounts. Debtors’ experiences may not be unique. Pre-screened retail card offers 
may be less commonly sent to all consumers. The query about credit offers was not limited to 
mailed offers, but consumers may not have counted point-of-sale offers made in retail stores. 
Another possibility is that retail cards are less segmented than general cards. These products 
could be one-size-fits-all, marketed with a rate and fees that reflect the creditworthiness and risk 
of the entire borrower base. Recent bankruptcy filers may not meet retailers’ lending criteria. The 
differential between general and retail credit card offers could suggest that many of the general 
credit cards offered to postbankruptcy families were subprime products. Some cards may have 
required collateral for the credit extension;159 others may have charged unusually high interest 
rates or required consumers to pay unusually expensive annual fees.160  Further evidence to 
support this hypothesis comes from debtors’ experiences in trying to actually get companies to 
issue them credit cards. Three years after bankruptcy, 44 percent of debtors said they were 
denied at least once when applying for a credit card. The interviews did not ask for detail about 
these credit rejections. Given the large number of credit offers most debtors received each 
month, I hypothesize that these rejections perhaps resulted from the debtor applying directly for 
a credit card (such as when offered to them during a retail purchase), rather than responding to 
prescreened solicitations mailed to postbankruptcy families. The credit offers that bankruptcy 
debtors receive may be tailored to distressed borrowers and carry correspondingly high rates or 
unfavorable terms.  
                                                 
159 Secured credit cards require consumers to pay a deposit, usually a minimum of a few hundred dollars, as a 
condition of the card’s issuance. The issuer holds this deposit, and the consumer makes monthly payments toward 
any accrued charges, fees, and interest. See Secured Cards Survey – November 2006 at 
http://www.cardweb.com/perl/cardlocator/survey/secured (describing secured cards as “ideal” for consumers with 
poor credit or no credit). For an example of the marketing and terms of a secured credit card, see Wells Fargo Credit 
Cards—Secured Visa Card at https://www.wellsfargo.com/credit_cards/select_card/secured/.  
160 Id. (reporting cards offering annual fees as high as $150 with interest rates as high as 23% APR.  
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A majority of families received solicitations for secured loans after bankruptcy, although 
these offers were somewhat less common than credit cards. Car loans are widely marketed to 
debtors. Many debtors were surprised to receive these offers, expressing concern that the 
substantial debt required to purchase a car would cause them financial trouble in the future. A 
young man from Pennsylvania told his interviewer that he had gotten car loans in the form of 
check, for up to $50,000 but that “[t]hey go right in the trash with the credit card offers.”161  
Comparable data for the general American population on the marketing of auto loans was 
not readily findable.162 However, bankruptcy debtors may be particularly likely to respond to 
unsolicited offers for auto financing. Repossession of a car may have been the last straw that 
precipitated a decision to file bankruptcy. Other families may voluntarily surrender a car in 
bankruptcy or be unable to defend a lender’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. The fact 
that families are lucrative targets for car purchases after bankruptcy reinforces the hardship that 
accompanies bankruptcy.163 Characterizations of debtors as strategic financial actors flounder 
against such reality. Lenders’ postbankruptcy marketing is tangible evidence of the financial 
rebuilding process that debtors must undergo after bankruptcy.  
Families who retain their homes despite filing bankruptcy are targets for second 
mortgages or home equity loans. About three-quarters of homeowners reported that they 
received offers to use their home as collateral to borrow. These loans carry the potential for 
relatively large debts. The marketing of home loans to recent bankruptcy debtors offers is 
consistent with evidence on the penetration of the mortgage industry deep into the subprime 
                                                 
161 Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, PA-07-074. 
162 Specialized marketing exists for car loans for the general nonbankrupt population, see CUNA Mutual Group, 
Compete in the auto loan market and win, at http://www.cunamutual.com/cmg/freeFormDetail/0,1248,4458,00.html 
but data on the quantity of loans was not available.  
163 I am conducting further research to examine how many debtors accept these loans and to document the price 
and terms of these loans. See Porter, Borrowing After Bankruptcy, supra note 107.  
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credit market.164 While a Congressman lamented the morality of a debtor who would buy a house 
and then file bankruptcy,165 the lending industry was actively soliciting families to risk their 
homes after bankruptcy by loading up on new debt.  
Another way to measure creditors’ willingness to lend to debtors is to study debtors’ 
perceived difficulty of obtaining credit.  
Three years after bankruptcy, families were asked if they had “been turned down for, or 
had trouble getting” certain types of loans. Many families responded that one or more of the 
queries were inapplicable because they had not attempted to obtain that type of loan. 
Notwithstanding some rejections, most debtors who wanted to borrow after bankruptcy seem 
able to do so. These data reinforce the findings illustrated in Figure 3 that debtors are not limited 
to secured lending but can borrow without collateral too. 
Figure 4 shows how families’ experiences in trying to obtain three types of credit after 
bankruptcy. The overall trend was that families with financial problems may have greater access 
to unsecured credit in the form of credit cards than to secured credit. Credit cards were 
particularly easy to obtain. Three years after discharging any prior credit card debts in 
bankruptcy, 60 percent of families had at least one new postbankruptcy credit card.166 
Approximately 24 percent of these new credit card holders believed that their bankruptcy had 
made it difficult for them to get these new cards. More than three in four families reported that 
bankruptcy did not cause them to be turned down for credit cards. 
                                                 
164 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets Revisited, 82 TEX. L. REV. 439 (2003); 
HARVARD JT. CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, supra note 80, tbl. 20.  
165 See 151 CONG. REC. S1813, S1813 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“Some folks have even been 
known to plan their bankruptcy. They buy a house or they buy a car or furniture or whatever else they need and then 
file a bankruptcy form. They figure they can get the big ticket items upfront, and for everything else they will use 
cash.”) 
166 A forthcoming paper presents more detailed data on families’ use of credit after bankruptcy.  See Porter, 
Borrowing after Bankruptcy, supra note 107.  
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FIGURE 4 
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Paradoxically, families found lenders more reluctant to lend to them on a secured basis 
than to issue them credit cards, which are frequently, although not always, unsecured lines of 
credit. Approximately 55 percent of those who financed a car purchase in the first three years 
after bankruptcy reported having difficulty obtaining a car loan.167 Figure 4 illustrates that 
families were twice as likely to find it difficult to get a car loan as to obtain a credit card. About 
one in three families who obtained a home loan after bankruptcy said that their bankruptcy 
caused them trouble in borrowing or caused their credit application to be refused.  
The presence of collateral should reduce a loan’s risk, both directly by increasing the 
lender’s ability to obtain repayment by foreclosing on the collateral and indirectly by enhancing 
                                                 
167 This number reflects only those who tried to take out a car loan. Many debtors paid cash for a car purchased 
after bankruptcy. These findings are discussed in detail in the next section on use of credit.  
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the borrower’s incentives to pay.168 Thus, secured credit should facilitate borrowing to less 
creditworthy consumers. In the commercial context, the most financially sound companies avoid 
secured credit.169 In the consumer context, however, vulnerable borrowers like bankruptcy 
debtors are more likely to struggle to obtain secured credit than unsecured credit. This 
differential may reflect the greater experience of the credit card industry with subprime 
borrowers, a trend that has arrived more recently in the mortgage and auto lending industries.170 
Perhaps in the consumer context, lenders cannot attract postbankruptcy debtors to secured 
lending products that fully reflect the expense of enforcing a security interest or monitoring 
collateral. Former bankruptcy debtors may have a harder time qualifying for the available 
secured credit products. Families may instead turn to credit cards to finance a car purchase 
through a cash advance or to serve the purpose of a home equity loan such as funding a home 
improvement project or paying unexpected medical bills. At least in the market for distressed 
consumers, unsecured credit that excuses borrowers from risking collateral is more widely 
available to risky customers than secured credit.  
Lenders repeatedly solicit families who file Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Bankruptcy creates 
obstacles for some credit transactions, but simultaneously guarantees a virtual flood of credit 
solicitations marketed specifically to postbankruptcy families. The widespread availability of 
credit starkly contrasts with assertions of bankruptcy debtors as immoral or strategic actors and 
highlights lenders’ interest in these families as a source of profit. 
                                                 
168 Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1997) (“Granting 
collateral lowers the aggregate costs of a lending transaction by lowering the pre-loan perception of the risk of 
default.”)  
169 Id. at 634.  
170 Cherie Berkley, Interest Rates Shake Up Subprime Lending Market, DEBT COLLECTION AND RISK 35 (Oct. 
2006).  
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E. Chapter 13 Twist  
This section compares how creditors react to Chapter 13 bankruptcy with the Chapter 7 
findings presented in the prior parts of the Article. Legal differences in two main types of 
consumer bankruptcy relief seem to translate into important differences in creditor behavior. The 
data suggest that despite the focus of bankruptcy reform on increasing the proportion of debtors 
who file Chapter 13 bankruptcy, lenders themselves favor Chapter 7 filers by offering them 
easier access to credit. 
In the vast majority of Chapter 7 cases, individuals receive a discharge of eligible debts 
two or three months after they filed their bankruptcy case.171 The discharge effectively ends the 
bankruptcy process for Chapter 7 debtors. No trustee or bankruptcy court supervises the credit 
activities of debtors after discharge. The prior statement is equally true in Chapter 13, but the 
discharge in Chapter 13 cases does not enter until the debtor has completed all required 
payments, which occurs between three and five years after plan confirmation.172 Chapter 13 
imposes obstacles to obtaining new credit. While making plan payments, debtors are required to 
get authorization before obtaining new credit.173 Many trustees emphasize this requirement to 
debtors,174 although in fact trustees may liberally grant such requests.175 Research on actual 
borrowing by Chapter 13 debtors could illuminate the extent to which this credit restraint 
                                                 
171 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15 ed. Revised) §§ 700.04 – 700.05. 
172 ID. at § 1328.01.  
173 11 U.S.C. §§ 1305(c), 1306(a)(2) and (b) and 549(a)(2)(B) (2006).  
174 See, e.g., Office of the Chapter 13 Trustee, Thomas P. King, 
http://www.ch13oshkosh.com/profile.html#newcredit; see also The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
includes the limitation on new credit in its public information about Chapter 13 Bankruptcy. See Admin. Office of 
U.S. Courts, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Basics,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/chapter13.htm/.  
175 See Braucher, One Code, supra note 68, at 539 & n. 130 (1993) (stating that trustees are receptive to new 
credit requests).  
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operates to curb the desires of lenders and bankruptcy debtors for borrowing during Chapter 13 
cases.176  
A brief analysis of credit marketing to Chapter 13 families powerfully illustrates how 
bankruptcy law shapes the incentives of the lending industry. Most families who file Chapter 13 
bankruptcy receive credit solicitations.177 More than three-quarters of families (76.7 percent) said 
that lenders had sent them credit offers in the first year after their bankruptcy filing. However, 
Chapter 13 families are significantly less likely to receive credit offers than Chapter 7 
families.178  The reported rate for Chapter 13 families is significantly lower than the fraction of 
Chapter 7 debtors (96.1 percent) who receive credit offers after filing bankruptcy. At least in the 
short-term, Chapter 13 seems to be a modest deterrent to the credit industry’s efforts to turn 
bankrupt families into customers.  
Figure 5 shows the frequency with which Chapter 13 filers reported being offered 
different types of credit during the first postbankruptcy year and illustrates the comparative 
difference with Chapter 7 debtors. The differences were significant for all credit offers except 
retail cards. 179 Lenders’ preference for Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors is most pronounced with 
regard to secured credit loans, as general credit cards were the only type of unsecured credit that 
                                                 
176 Further research could yield insights on how actual credit use during a Chapter 13 case may influence Chapter 
13 outcomes as measured by plan completion and discharge.  
177 These data come from the Chapter 13 cases collected in the core sample in which a first round telephone 
interview was completed. The same method was used for the Chapter 7 sample considered in Parts II A-D. First 
round interviews were completed by 243 families who filed Chapter 13; this figure represents 51.5 percent of the 
470 total Chapter 13 cases in the core sample. Note that these data reflect all families who filed Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, but that some portion of these families may have dismissed their Chapter 13 cases before the interview 
at one year postbankruptcy filing. Indeed, the completion rate for Chapter 13 is notoriously low. See Scott Norberg, 
Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (67% of chapter 
13 filings were either dismissed or converted before completion.); Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor 
Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 557, 571-74 (2001) 
(summarizing variations in Chapter 13 completion rate in various studies). I do not exclude cases that were 
dismissed or converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy because I am focused on creditor reaction to a debtor’s bankruptcy 
choice, rather than how debtors use credit during the postbankruptcy period.  
178 P ≤ .001.  
179  P ≤ .05.  
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showed a significant difference by chapter. Both car loans and second mortgages are 
significantly less available to families who filed Chapter 13 than families who filed Chapter 7. 
Perhaps the need to obtain permission for post-filing credit in Chapter 13 deters lenders; this 
requirement theoretically adds expense and hassle to the loan transaction costs. Alternatively 
(and to my mind, more plausibly), this difference may reflect the practical needs of Chapter 7 
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors. Families who file Chapter 13 may retain non-exempt assets 
such as a car or home and continue making payments on the debt through their Chapter 13 plan, 
curing any default that existed at the time of the bankruptcy.180 In contrast, Chapter 7 debtors 
may surrender these assets in bankruptcy or be less likely to own them.181 Thus, lenders may 
exert less effort marketing secured loans to Chapter 13 families because these families may be 
less responsive to such offers.  
                                                 
180 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF 
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 281  (5th ed. 2006). 
181 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 205 n.27.   
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FIGURE 5 
Chapter 13 Debtors Receiving Different Types of Credit Offers 
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Even if Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors have identical postbankruptcy borrowing 
preferences,182 the law creates different lending risks to debtors based on the type of bankruptcy 
filed. Because consumers can convert their bankruptcies from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7,183 
unsecured credit extended to a Chapter 13 debtor after their initial filing would be subject to 
discharge if the case were converted to Chapter 7.184 This effect may constrain the availability of 
credit cards to Chapter 13 debtors while they are paying into their plans. Data on the number of 
credit offers could help test this hypothesis. Chapter 13 filers said they received an average of 
8.65 credit offers per month; Figure 2, supra, shows Chapter 7 filers’ average was 14.56 offers 
                                                 
182 I do not make any assumption that families who chose Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 would, in fact, have the 
same desire for or beliefs about the availability of postbankruptcy credit. Scholars have expended considerable effort 
to explain why debtors chose the chapter of relief that they do, see, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, "The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience From the Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts." 17 HARVARD J. OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 801, 814-15 (1994); but no study has extensively 
considered the role of this factor in shaping a debtor’s decision. Jean Braucher’s research on lawyers’ role in 
debtors’ filing decisions may be the best effort to date. See Braucher, One Code, supra note 68.  
183 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a). 
184 See Braucher, One Code, supra note 68, at 538.   
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per month.185 A similar margin existed at the median, with the typical Chapter 13 debtor 
receiving half (five per month) the number of offers of the typical Chapter 7 debtor (ten per 
month.) The data do not permit a complete understanding of the reasons for Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 credit marketing. The less frequent credit solicitations to Chapter 13 families may 
reflect the fact that some lenders simply avoid Chapter 13 debtors entirely. Marketers, in turns 
may have more success selling data on Chapter 7 filers, who lenders prefer as customers. 
Chapter 13 families were substantially less likely to report credit offers that mentioned their 
bankruptcy or were received from a prebankruptcy creditor. Figure 6 shows these findings and 
comparative data from Chapter 7 debtors. 
FIGURE 6 
Differency By Chapter: 
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Overall, lenders exhibit a customer preference for Chapter 7 filers over Chapter 13 filers. 
This preference does not square with the credit industry’s backing of bankruptcy reform that 
                                                 
185 P ≤ .001.  
 51
allegedly would screen more families into Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Despite their rhetoric 
championing Chapter 13 as the “honorable” path for families in serious financial trouble, the 
lending industry is more likely to cast away a family who chooses Chapter 13. Congressional 
representatives repeatedly emphasized the policy importance of partial debt repayment in 
Chapter 13.186 However, lenders are less likely to reward families who chose Chapter 13 by 
offering them additional credit. This differential treatment by creditors has implications for the 
design of bankruptcy law.  
Despite debtors’ trepidations and creditors’ warnings before bankruptcy, borrowing after 
bankruptcy is not only possible after bankruptcy, such activity is actively encouraged by the 
credit industry. These data suggest that creditors’ threats to refuse credit after bankruptcy are 
hollow. The credit industry may tell consumers that they will not lend after bankruptcy and that 
paying the debt is the only option to maintain their credit access, but such statements are largely 
untrue. Rather than resulting from a marketing mistake, the widespread availability of 
postbankruptcy credit more likely reflects a careful calculus about the profits of lending to 
customers vulnerable to financial distress. The bankruptcy system shapes creditors’ ability to 
profit from former bankrupts, and law can play a critical role in defining the appropriate 
boundaries of credit solicitation.  
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Unraveling the “Strategic” Story 
 The findings about postbankruptcy credit solicitation do not legitimate the strategic 
debtor model as a serious concern for lenders. Advocates of bankruptcy reform often conflated 
                                                 
186 See 145 CONG. REC. 8509, 8580 (1999) (statement of Rep. Delay) (“Mr. Chairman, the bankruptcy bill under 
consideration today is based on the premise that those debtors who can afford to repay their debt should do so, rather 
than have it forgiven. To accomplish this seemingly simple goal, an income-based means test is employed to 
determine if a debtor could do one of three things: have debt forgiven; reorganize and enter into a repayment plan; 
or refrain from filing bankruptcy at all.”)  
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prodigality with immorality, making it difficult to unravel the exact behavior by debtors (other 
than the act of filing bankruptcy) that was undesirable. Some policymakers conjectured that the 
stigma of bankruptcy had declined and suggested that families lacked the moral fiber to honor 
their obligations.187 This view of bankrupt families suggests that debtors have serious character 
flaws. Lenders’ rampant solicitation of bankruptcy debtors refutes this characterization of 
bankruptcy filers as profligate and untrustworthy. If lenders believed that bankruptcy files were 
inherent promise-breakers, they would not pursue them as customers. Positioned with public 
knowledge of the bankruptcy and impressive technology for assessing risk, the credit industry 
chooses to target bankruptcy debtors with credit solicitations. These efforts are inconsistent with 
characterizations of bankruptcy filers as people who do not indent to or try to honor their 
obligations.  
The obvious response to this critique is to emphasize concerns that the prior bankruptcy 
laws permitted consumers to engage in strategic borrowing before bankruptcy. This view does 
not necessarily rely on immutable or chronic character traits. Instead, bankruptcy debtors are 
portrayed as brutally rational actors, who ratchet up debt with the intent to use bankruptcy law to 
escape repayment.188 This economic incentive analysis of consumer default emphasizes the 
moral hazard of the bankruptcy discharge.189 This theory of consumer borrowing would not 
expect families to default immediately after their bankruptcy because the law prohibits repeated 
bankruptcy discharges in close proximity.190 Thus, creditors can market safely to these families 
because the law assures them that bankruptcy will not be an immediate consequence of the 
                                                 
187 See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. JAN. 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Not long ago in our 
Nation’s past, there was an expectation that people should repay what they have borrowed. Hand in hand with this 
expectation was a stigma that attached to those who filed bankruptcy.”); see also Warren & Lawless, The Myth of 
the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 743, 784 (2005). 
188 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1483-85.  
189 Id. at 1491. 
190 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8). At the time these data were gathered from 2001 through 2004, the ban on 
subsequent filings was six years. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2000).  
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borrowing. Without doubt, the ban on subsequent bankruptcy discharges has some effect on 
credit marketing.191 But it alone may be insufficient to explain the desirability of postbankruptcy 
families as customers. The basic economics of default and Chapter 7 support this point. Most 
consumers default without filing bankruptcy and do so before bankruptcy; the amount of 
charged-off debt significantly exceeds the amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy.192 The 
simple truth is that creditors can go unpaid with or without a bankruptcy discharge. Over 96 
percent of Chapter 7 filings are no-asset cases, suggesting that many families may be judgment-
proof or nearly so.193 This reality means that lenders do not necessarily recover less because a 
family chooses bankruptcy instead of “informal” bankruptcy—sustained nonpayment backed by 
applicable non-bankruptcy law’s limits on debt collection.194 Similarly, after Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, a majority of families could likely evade repaying any postbankruptcy borrowing 
because they will continue to be judgment-proof. Future research could examine whether lenders 
continue to offer credit as the time after bankruptcy elapses. To the extent that they do so, it 
suggests that the ability to discharge debt in bankruptcy is not a major consideration in driving 
lenders’ evaluations of a family’s desirability as a customer.  
The findings on postbankruptcy credit marketing are inconsistent with the immorality or 
strategic theories of bankruptcy debtors. To the extent that lenders believe bankruptcy indicates 
poor character, the public act of bankruptcy guarantees that lenders can identify these families 
and refuse them new credit. In this way, bankruptcy solves the information asymmetry problem 
                                                 
191 See Part B, infra, for a discussion of ways in which bankruptcy law facilitates postbankruptcy credit 
opportunity. 
192 Ausubel, supra note 40, at 253 & fig. 1. 
193 See supra sources cited at note 156; see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 180, at 350-51. 
194 See Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy 1 (Twelfth Annual Utah Winter 
Finance Conference, Working Paper 58, Feb. 2002) (stating that 50.7% of credit card loans were charged off for 
reasons other than bankruptcy.); Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?  J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 205 (1998) (exploring reasons why many debtors default but do not file bankruptcy).  
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by flagging for lenders these families who are willing to file bankruptcy.195 More pointedly, if 
lenders are seriously worried about the stigma of bankruptcy declining, they are in an ideal 
position to deter such an effect. If creditors refused to lend to families after bankruptcy, families 
who are considering bankruptcy may be more inclined to continue to struggle to repay their 
debts. In this way, lenders did not necessarily need bankruptcy reform to address stigma 
“problem;” they themselves could have sharpened consequences of bankruptcy. Instead, lenders 
engaged in behavior contrary to their professed beliefs about the need for bankruptcy reform. 
The postbankruptcy credit findings show lenders engaging in “strategic” decisions of their own. 
During the very same years in which the credit industry pushed policymakers to enact 
bankruptcy reform,196 creditors were hard at work trying to lure bankruptcy debtors as new 
customers. 
The extent of postbankruptcy credit solicitation is suggestive of lenders’ actual beliefs 
about the causes of bankruptcy. Efforts to lend to postbankruptcy families are more consistent 
with an adverse events model of bankruptcy than the “deadbeat” debtor model.197 The data are 
not conclusive on this point; a bankruptcy filing clearly changes the ability of a consumer to 
engage in strategic borrowing. However, lenders’ intense solicitation of postbankruptcy families 
is consistent with an understanding of the consumer bankruptcy system as a refuge for decent, 
honest families reacting to adverse events such as job loss or illness.198 These events are 
                                                 
195 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1496 (describing concern of economist William Meckling that 
lenders could not effectively distinguish risk of consumers for bankruptcy).  
196 Bankruptcy cases in this sample were filed in 2001 and the first and second longitudinal interviews conducted 
in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Bankruptcy reform bills were introduced into each Congress during this period. See 
Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 384 tbl. 1.  
197 I put this term in quotes because in reality credit card issuers call people who pay off their balances in full 
each month “deadbeats.” Those who accumulate balances and make minimal payments are termed “revolvers,” a 
group that the top lobbyist for the American Bankers Association called the “sweet spot” of lending. See Frontline, 
Secret History of the Credit Card, supra note 114 (interview with Edward Yingling) (“I think it is generally 
understood that those that use the revolving part of the credit card are kind of the sweet spot.”)  
198 See sources cited supra note 13. 
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exogenous to a consumer’s desire or intent to repay. If bankruptcy were endogenous in origin 
and primarily reflected a family’s willingness to engage in ruthless default, lenders should avoid 
these families after bankruptcy for fear of future non-payment. 
Creditors’ actions speak louder than their words.199 Despite public protests about 
declining stigma and strategic debtors, creditors want to count these families among their 
customers. Bankruptcy reform’s focus on debtors largely missed this insight.200 Lenders’ 
behavior toward postbankruptcy families highlights the need for policymakers to consider how 
credit policy facilitates strategic lending and ways in which law could reduce undesirable 
consequences of such behavior. 201  
B. Bankruptcy Incentives 
The debtor focus of the bankruptcy reform debate hindered careful study of how 
bankruptcy law shapes the behavior of creditors. In this section, I identify three ways in which 
this Article’s findings on postbankruptcy credit opportunity could be useful in crafting 
bankruptcy policy. Efforts to alter creditors’ legal incentives capitalize on creditors’ rationality 
as a tool for improving the bankruptcy system.  
 Widespread postbankruptcy credit marketing is not an inevitable absolute, but is a 
product of existing bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy discharges are not unlimited goods.202 The law’s 
                                                 
199 See Frontline, Secret History of the Credit Card, supra note 114 (interview with Edward Yingling), at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/etc/synopsis.html.  
200 There were exceptions, of course, including some who publicly decried the hypocrisy of creditors’ support of 
the bankruptcy bill. See Frontline, supra note 114 (untelevised interview with Sen. Christopher Dodd), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/battle.html.  (“The problem is that the credit card 
companies want it both ways. . . . On one hand, they want unfettered access to new customers, irrespective of 
whether these new customers are financially literate, or have the ability to repay the debts they incur. At the same 
time, they want to be protected when they overextend credit to these very same customers.”)  
201 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1565 (“To the extent that rationality and opportunism exist in 
consumer credit transactions, they both appear to exist on the lender, not the borrower side of the equation. Those 
who would seek to reduce the bankruptcy filing rate should focus there as well.”) See Pottow, supra note 6, at 429 
(noting that it takes “two to tango” with bankruptcy-causing debt and suggesting that bankruptcy lawmaking could 
have usefully considered ways to change creditor behavior). 
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). 
 56
prohibition on repeat filings facilitates creditors’ ability to profit from lending to recent 
bankruptcy debtors. Eliminating a bankruptcy discharges removes one barrier to collecting the 
debt and frees the creditor to continue collecting, during which time interest and fees accumulate. 
The ban on repeat filing helps to insulate lenders from the risk of ultimate nonpayment (but does 
guarantee repayment). In this way, the discharge limitation increases postbankruptcy credit 
marketing.  
Current law permits a Chapter 7 discharge only if a debtor has not received a discharge in 
the prior eight years.203 This time period was lengthened as part of BAPCPA,204 a change that 
should increase postbankruptcy credit marketing. Policymakers advocated this reform as 
necessary to reduce debtors’ incentives to file bankruptcy as a financial planning strategy. 
However, the sharpest effect of a discharge limitation may be on creditors, not debtors. The 
repeat filing rate for Chapter 7 bankruptcies was already very low before BAPCPA.205 However, 
lenders can exploit the extended prohibition on discharge to maximize profits from 
postbankruptcy lending. Because many families continue to struggle to make ends meet after 
bankruptcy,206 postbankruptcy families are ideal revenue sources for fee and interest income.  
The practical effect of a bankruptcy discharge also aids postbankruptcy creditors. A 
bankruptcy discharge frees a debtor from servicing prebankruptcy debts. From the new lender’s 
perspective, the discharge has eliminated the competition for repayment. Instead of joining a 
heap of other unpaid debts, early postbankruptcy creditors occupy an enviable position. The odds 
of receiving payment are improved, and the ability to file bankruptcy is curtailed. 
                                                 
203 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8).  
204 See Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 312; 119 Stat. 23, 87. The bankruptcy cases in this Article’s sample were filed in 
2001 when the ban on repeat Chapter 7 discharges was six years.  
205 SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 192 (1989) 
(stating that of the 1502 petitions in their sample only 8% were repeat filers). 
206 Porter & Thorne, supra note 57.  
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An exclusive focus on debtors has impoverished prior policymaking on the optimal scope 
of the bankruptcy discharge. The discharge does not just affect prebankruptcy debts; it has 
powerful consequences for debtors’ fresh start after bankruptcy because it changes the context 
for future borrowing. Acknowledging how creditors’ respond to bankruptcy enriches our ability 
to evaluate the ideal boundaries of discharge. The postbankruptcy borrowing findings presented 
here do not conclusively point to a particular reform, which should be supported by research on 
how debtors use postbankruptcy credit. The data do suggest some immediate recommendations 
for bankruptcy’s new financial education requirement.207 Education providers need to be 
responsive to the reality of postbankruptcy credit solicitation in their curricula.208 The debtors’ 
reactions of frustration, anger, and fear about postbankruptcy credit marketing emphasize the 
need to educate families about their ability to use existing law to opt-out of prescreened credit 
offers. This modest recommendation integrates existing consumer law into BAPCPA’s financial 
education requirement to aid families in capitalizing on their fresh start after bankruptcy. Debtors 
could chose to eliminate solicitations for credit and wrestle affirmative control of credit 
marketing from lenders. 
The second implication for bankruptcy law derives from the findings on the relative 
differences between postbankruptcy availability of secured and unsecured credit. The data 
suggest a declining spectrum of credit availability from general credit cards to car loans to 
mortgage loans. This pattern may be opposite of the ideal for facilitating debtors’ financial 
recovery. Purchasing or refinancing a home is lauded as a wealth-building strategy,209 yet after 
                                                 
207 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11).  
208 See Deborah Thorne & Katherine Porter, Financial Education of Families in Bankruptcy, __ J. of Consumer 
Ed. ___ (forthcoming 2007) (articulating how education needs of bankrupt families may differ from general 
population for financial education). 
209 Edward M. Gramlich, Governor of Federal reserve, Remarks at Home Ownership Summit of the Local 
Initiatives Support Corporation (Nov. 8, 2001), available at 
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bankruptcy this may be the most difficult credit transaction to complete. On the other hand, new 
empirical research suggests that credit cards, which are widely available after bankruptcy, may 
stimulate financial distress.210 Current law does not attempt to influence these outcomes, perhaps 
due to a lack of prior research. The law could treat certain types of postbankruptcy debt 
differently in the event that a family experiences future hardship. While home mortgage debt 
already gets favorable treatment in Chapter 13 bankruptcy,211 the law could create further 
distinctions. For example, credit card loans made in the immediate aftermath of prior bankruptcy 
could be subordinated to the obligations or barred from using wage garnishment as a collection 
tool. Alternatively, the law could prohibit credit solicitations for a cooling-off period after 
bankruptcy,212 or give debtors a defense of suitability for loans made after bankruptcy without 
evidence that the debtor is likely to repay.213 This Article’s findings are alone insufficient, at 
least in my mind, to justify such reforms. Credit availability after bankruptcy could, in fact, be a 
powerful tool for helping families achieve financial well-being after bankruptcy.214 These data 
may highlight the need for further longitudinal bankruptcy research. 
Finally, the comparative findings on Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 credit availability are 
provocative for policies aimed at favoring repayment as part of consumer bankruptcy relief. 
BAPCPA’s means test was framed as an effort to increase the number of debtors who chose 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2001/200111082/default.htm (“For a family, a home is 
generally its most significant asset and serves as its primary wealth-building vehicle.”) 
210 See Mann, CHARGING AHEAD, supra 38, at 46-47; cf. Katherine Porter, The Debt Dilemma, __ MICH. L. REV. 
___ (forthcoming 2008) (reviewing Charging Ahead and offering empirical data identifying complexity of 
relationship between cards and financial well-being).  
211 See 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2). 
212 Enzer et al., supra note 62, at 90 (reporting that the only suggestion specifically directed at the issue of 
postbankruptcy credit was a six-month prohibition on credit and that this was found to be “very undesirable” with 
problems of “feasibility” and “interference” with debtors’ lives raised).  
213 Cf. Kathleen C. Engle & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory 
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317-1366 (May 2002) (discussing government imposition of a suitability standard 
as a possible solution to the problem of predatory lending.) 
214 Cf. Pottow, supra note 6, at 418 (calling for careful development of policy prescriptions to focus specifically 
on “bad” credit rather than reduce the overall amount of credit).  
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Chapter 13 bankruptcy and attempt to repay some of their debts.215 The postbankruptcy data 
reinforce the improbability that creditors’ purpose in lobbying for bankruptcy reform was 
increasing Chapter 13 filings as a proportion of bankruptcy cases.216 Creditors’ own actions give 
over indebted consumers the opposite incentive—to choose Chapter 7 because it will afford them 
greater access to credit after bankruptcy. At least during the first years after filing, Chapter 13 
debtors seem to have less credit access than Chapter 7 debtors and face legal obstacles to using 
credit. Additional research could illuminate whether Chapter 13 debtors do, in fact, have access 
to more affordable credit after completion of their Chapter 13 plans than Chapter 7 debtors. 
These findings could have important implications for bankruptcy professionals who counsel 
potential debtors based on unsupported perceptions about difference in credit availability by 
chapter. This Article’s data suggest that families may be misled in thinking that Chapter 13 will 
improve their credit access, at least in the short term.217 Policy efforts to encourage Chapter 13 
need to consider postbankruptcy borrowing and how law could shift lenders’ incentives to 
enhance the attractiveness of Chapter 13. Collectively, the findings reinforce the conclusion of 
Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger that “[i]t is senseless to look at consumers’ incentives to 
borrow without also considering lenders’ incentives to extend credit. Thus, consumer bankruptcy 
                                                 
215 See 151 CONG. REC. H1993, H2053 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“The means test 
applies clear and well-defined standards to determine whether a debtor has the financial capability to pay his or her 
debts. The application of such objective standards will help ensure that the fresh start provisions of Chapter VII will 
be granted to those who need them, while debtors who can afford to repay some of their debts are steered toward 
filing Chapter 13 bankruptcies.”)  
216 I do not comment on Congress’ purpose in enacting bankruptcy relief. My focus is on the purpose of creditors 
in supporting bankruptcy reform. Actual legislative history on BAPCPA is sparse, and courts must cope with the 
consequences of that reality. Efforts to substitute academic commentary on BAPCPA for legitimate legislative 
history are inappropriate and misguided, frequently missing the possibility of a distinction between why Congress 
voted for the bill and why creditors lobbied for it. See Mann, Sweatbox, supra 1, at 379 (arguing that credit card 
issuers could not have expected increased payout from bankruptcy reform but instead hoped to increase profits 
before bankruptcy by raising obstacles to filing).   
217 The data herein concern the frequency and type of credit solicitations and debtors’ self-report difficulty in 
obtaining credit. More extensive research on the costs and terms of credit could show significant differences in 
postbankruptcy credit that favor Chapter 13 filers.  
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law, and indeed all consumer law, should be crafted with an understanding of both sides of a 
consumer finance transaction.”218 
C. The Expense of Profit 
The story of postbankruptcy credit has implications beyond bankruptcy.  Recent 
bankruptcy debtors are an exemplar of financially vulnerable Americans. Confronting lenders’ 
marketing to these families provokes consideration of the appropriate scope of lending to 
financial distressed individuals. Such transactions may generate profits for creditors but impose 
unacceptable costs on society and consumers. 
Recent scholarship has posited that lending models no longer require full and timely 
repayment for profitability. John Pottow has observed that this profit model “turns the 
conventional paradigm of credit risk assessment on its head” and suggested some of these loans 
may be “reckless.”219 Families who do not repay quickly or in full are the most profitable 
customers for some lending products.220 These creditors rely for profit principally on income 
from late fees, over the limit fees, and accumulating interest.221 Ronald Mann has detailed this 
profit model in the context of debt-based credit card issuers.222 Subprime mortgages and car 
loans may rely similarly on faltering repayment efforts to maximize profits; more research on 
these transactions is needed. Certainly, products targeted specifically at financially-strapped 
borrowers such as payday loans and auto-title loans rely heavily on fee revenue.223 Ultimate 
                                                 
218 See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1556-57.  
219 Pottow, supra note 6, at 414.  
220 Id. at 414-17 (collecting research on profitability of possible or likely defaulting borrowers).  
221 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 392  (“If we imagine borrowers who limp along, carrying [balances] for 
decades—neither discharging them in bankruptcy, nor ever paying them off entirely, perhaps making an occasional 
minor purchase—we can se how profitable this business model can be.”) 
222 Mann, Sweat Box, supra note 1.  
223 See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 855, 862 (2007) (noting that 
economics of payday lending revolves around standard fee per loan); Jean Ann Fox & Elizabeth Guy, Driven into 
Debt: CFA Car Title Loan Store and Online Survey (Nov. 2005) (describing fees for auto title loans); see also 
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repayment may not be necessary for a highly profitable transaction. Block-Lieb and Janger have 
observed that this profit model explains why rational lenders would have continued to expand 
consumer credit and reduce their lending standards even as bankruptcy filings increased.224 Lost 
profit from charge-offs or bankruptcy discharges can be offset by delinquency-derived revenues. 
In this economic model, the higher bankruptcy rate is merely a consequence of different lending 
criterion.225  
Postbankruptcy debtors are even better candidates for the debt “sweatbox” or “reckless 
loans” than prebankruptcy debtors. While the American Bankers Association’s president has 
minimized credit card issuers’ interest in having financially distressed customers,226 a lending 
industry publication has described the “trick” in subprime lending as finding consumers 
who have “bottomed out” but is “looking to rebuild his life.”227 The reasons are easiest to 
understand in the context of credit cards but could apply equally to other loan products. These 
families have previously relied on cards (and on debt financing generally) so borrowing is part of 
the family’s financial routine.228 They likely have few to no cards (and perhaps have other 
cancelled loans) when marketing begins after bankruptcy so that postbankruptcy lenders increase 
                                                                                                                                                             
Berkley, supra note 170, at 2 (“Most subprime lenders are relying on fees as a countermeasure” to consumers with 
“less than stellar credit”).  
224 Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1488.  
225 Id.  
226 Frontline, supra note 114 (untelevised interview with Edward Yingling) available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/credit/more/battle.html.  (“You just can’t build a long-term 
financial relationship with someone who mismanages their personal finances.”) This statement is intriguing. First, it 
suggests that lenders may be seeking to maximize short-term profits from customers, dumping them if they fail to 
generate profits or generate significant losses. Second, the reference to mismanagement of personal finances is 
telling. If Mr. Yingling is correct, then the industry’s interest in bankruptcy debtors must suggest that lenders do not 
see bankruptcy as evidence of a family’s financial mismanagement but rather as the result of exogenous adverse 
financial events.  
227 Berkley, supra note 170, at 2. (quoting Alan Weinberg, “They said the trick in all this is to find the guy who 
has bottomed out and is looking to rebuild his life, to rebuild his credit and is on the way back. You don't want to be 
lending money to the guy who is still sliding down. . . . So in essence they said that they go to the people who are in 
the worst situations but yet have procured a job—they have now been gainfully employed for some period of time 
and have the wherewithal to stabilize their situation to be able to pay.” 
228 Porter, Debt Dilemma, supra note 209, at ___ (providing data from 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
showing 91.44% of all debtors had at least one credit card debt when they filed bankruptcy). 
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the chances that their card gets used frequently rather than stored in a drawer with dozens of 
others.229 Consumers may be particularly reluctant to switch lenders by transferring a balance (or 
refinancing a secured loans) for fears of adverse activity on their credit report. These families’ 
desperation to rebuild credit after bankruptcy helps lenders avoid the “switching” consequence of 
raising fees.230 Families may also believe that postbankruptcy credit options are uniformly 
expensive and fail to shop.231 Thus, unlike with nonbankrupt consumers a “great new rate of 
18%” may actually lure in customers.232 Finally, postbankruptcy families cannot discharge their 
debts in bankruptcy for a period of years, reducing one source of loss for lenders.  
With the exception of the latter limitation on bankruptcy discharge, former bankrupts 
face financial circumstances similar to those of other populations who have attracted concern 
about undesirable credit marketing. Several researchers have advocated for restrictions on credit 
solicitations aimed at college students.233 Like postbankruptcy debtors,234 college students earn 
low incomes but are anticipating higher incomes and improved financial circumstances in the 
future. Thus, they may be attracted to borrowing to smooth consumption in anticipation of a 
better future. Yet, many people will overestimate their future prospects and ability to service 
                                                 
229 See Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 390 (explaining that worst credit card customers are those who accept 
cards and use them infrequently).  
230 This response of an elderly woman from Texas to her experience with credit cards after bankruptcy is 
illustrative of how debtors deal with cards after bankruptcy. “I accepted one credit card to re-establish my credit. 
I’ve been offered a number of offers, but I’m leery of credit; I have been for a long, long time.” Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year Postbankruptcy, TX-07-101. A married man in his 30s said 
that his family had accepted one new credit card from Capital One after bankruptcy. He explained his reasoning as 
follows: “It has a low limit—only $300. I got it to re-establish myself. I’m trying to pay as much as I can [on the 
balance] and make sure it’s on time.” Consumer Bankruptcy Project III, Respondent Interview One-Year 
Postbankruptcy, TX-07-100. 
231 This belief may in fact be correct. Additional research on postbankruptcy credit could usefully help families, 
their bankruptcy attorneys and financial educators evaluate options for postbankruptcy financing.  
232 Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 389 (theorizing that lenders face difficulty in attracting nonbankrupt 
customers that could be vulnerable to distress without offering them unprofitably low initial interest rate).  
233 MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 158.   
234 Porter & Thorne, supra note 57, at 95-96. 
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debt.235 Similarly to postbankruptcy debtors, college students also have few existing credit 
obligations compared to typical Americans, allowing an early lender to enjoy a sustained period 
of profitability. College students and postbankruptcy debtors both face difficulty in meeting bills 
without borrowing. The credit industry’s intense marketing to postbankruptcy families parallels 
their efforts to lure other vulnerable borrowers into lending relationships. Because bankruptcy is 
a public process, recent bankruptcy debtors offer a useful group to study to understand creditors’ 
strategies for profiting from financially vulnerable consumers.   
If lenders’ intense solicitation of such customers indeed is drive by these families’ 
propensity to pay late, go over the limit, and revolve large balances, society may wish to prohibit 
or constrain such lending.236 Lending strategies that profit from financial distress may be 
suboptimal because they force society to bear the costs of such distress.237 As Ronald Mann has 
observed in another context, “lender’s incentives differ from the ideal incentives just as much as 
the borrower’s incentives do.”238  Concern about the externalities of financial distress could 
motivate policymaking designed to deter lending opportunism by shifting these costs to 
creditors.  
CONCLUSION 
Consumer credit policies and bankruptcy law affect the well-being of millions of 
American families. In the face of assumptions, theories, and lobbying rhetoric, empirical 
research reveals the real world consequences of policymaking. This Article’s findings on 
                                                 
235 Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2, at 1540-43 (collecting evidence of cognitive estimation bias of consumers 
in estimating future income); cf. Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, AM. 
ECON. REV., 50, 70-71 (1991) (describing how consumers underestimate current and future borrowing).  
236 Pottow, supra note 6, at 455 (“Much hand wringing occurred in Congress regarding the death of personal 
responsibility that practically made bankruptcy reform a moral imperative . . . there was no concomitant call for 
personal responsibility of lenders.”) (internal citations omitted).  
237 Id. at 412-13 (summarizing likely externalities but noting that evidence is more “intuitive than empirical at 
this juncture.”)  
238 Mann, Secured Credit, supra note 1, at 683, n. 89.  
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postbankruptcy credit highlight the shortcomings of debtor-oriented debate about consumer 
credit and bankruptcy. Efforts to lure recent bankruptcy debtors to borrow after bankruptcy belie 
creditors’ characterizations of these families as immoral strategic actors. Rather than eschewing 
them as profligates, the lending industry treats families who seek bankruptcy relief as a lucrative 
source for profits. The widespread marketing to families after bankruptcy provides a powerful 
example of the credit industry’s willingness and ability to profit from financially distressed and 
vulnerable consumers. The law shapes creditors’ marketing and lending decisions to recently 
bankrupt families, but this effect was hidden during the past decade of bankruptcy reform. 
Understanding lenders’ incentives in the current credit market yields useful ideas on how 
bankruptcy and other consumer law can improve credit policy and reduce the collective harms of 
financial distress.  
